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TOWARD MILITARY RULE? A CRITIQUE
OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
TO USE THE MILITARY IN DOMESTIC
EMERGENCIES
JACKIE GARDINA*
I. INTRODUCTION
When President Musharraf declared martial law in Pakistan, he
quoted President Lincoln, citing Lincoln's suspension of rights during
the Civil War as justification for his own state of emergency.1 Given the
universal outcry against his actions, President Musharraf's reliance on
American history deserves notice. As a general matter, Americans are
confident that an American President could not engage in similar
conduct. But the question is whether that confidence is warranted. As
President Musharraf's reference to American history suggests, the
American President does have the authority to use military force2 to
respond to internal dissent. The more pressing concern is what
safeguards, if any, are in place to prevent the abuse of that authority.
* Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I would like to thank the following
individuals for their guidance and insights: Bruce Duthu, Pam Stephens, Steve Dycus,
Norman Stein, Margaret Raymond, Mark Sidel, and especially Diane Mazur. I also want to
express my gratitude to my parents, Jack and Jean Gardina. You both encouraged my
curiosity, challenged my thinking, taught me the value of education, and, perhaps most
importantly, led by example.
1. David Rohde, Pakistani Sets Emergency Rule, Defying the U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 4,
2007, at Al.
2. For purposes of this Article, "military force" or "armed force" refers to both the
regular armed services as well as the federalized National Guard. When the distinction is
significant to the Article's thesis, the form of military intervention is noted. The phrase
"military force" or "armed force" is more complex than it appears. As is discussed in more
detail below, the President has access to both the federal military (the regular Army, Navy,
Air Force) and the federalized National Guard. See infra Part II.B. Thus, military or armed
force could come in either form. See id. On the one hand, the distinction is irrelevant to the
discussion because the Executive's growing discretion to respond to domestic emergencies
with military force regardless of its form is troubling. On the other hand, the Framers
thought the distinction was significant, anointing the militia as the primary domestic security
force. See infra Part II.A. This Article takes the position that the form of the force is
significant in certain situations; specifically that when the President employs armed force
domestically, the National Guard should be the first line of defense.
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The central purpose of this Article is to explore what safeguards do
exist to protect the American public from the type of conduct visited
upon the Pakistani people. From a brief review of the debates
surrounding the creation of the United States' government, it is clear
that the founding generation was very conscious of the threat posed by a
strong Executive Branch with access to military power. As a result, it
created a series of checks intended to make it difficult for an Executive
to harness that power against the public. Unfortunately, over time
Congress has undermined this foundational structure and eroded the
safeguards intended to prevent the pooling of military power in the
Executive Branch.
But Congress is beginning to re-examine the Executive's increasing
power to engage the military domestically. Even before the declaration
of military rule in Pakistan, some members of Congress had begun to
question the Executive's discretionary authority to use military force in
the domestic sphere and recognized the threat posed by such authority.3
Following 9/11 and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Bush
Administration called for an increased role for the Department of
Defense and the federal armed forces in responding to domestic
emergencies.4  Through a variety of statutory measures, Congress
answered the President's request for enhanced authority, increasing the
Executive Branch's discretionary power to deploy the federal armed
forces domestically.' Congress's most recent enactment, an amendment
to the Insurrection Act,6 however, faced resistance in both the House
and the Senate because it was perceived as inappropriately increasing
3. The current debate is centered on the recent amendment to the Insurrection Act,
authorizing the President to use military force to "restore public order and enforce the laws of
the United States when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public
health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any State or possession of
the United States, the President determines that" the constituted authorities are unable to do
so. 10 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (2006). As will be discussed more fully below, every state governor
opposed the amendment, contending that it constituted a radical shift in authority from
governors as commanders in chief of the National Guard to the federal government. See
Letter from National Governors Association to The Honorable Bill Frist, Senate Majority
Leader, The Honorable Harry Reid, Senate Minority Leader, The Honorable J. Dennis
Hastert, Speaker of the House, and The Honorable Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader,
(Aug. 6, 2006), available at http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga (Select "Letters" hyperlink;
select "Aug. 6, 2006" hyperlink) [hereinafter National Governor's Association Letter].
4. See, e.g., Ken Herman, Bush Ponders Larger Role for Military in Disasters, PALM
BEACH POST (West Palm Beach, Fla.), Sept. 26, 2005, at A7.
5. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 333; Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
§ 101(a), 116 Stat. 2135, 2142 (establishing Department of Homeland Security); USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
6. 10 U.S.C. § 333.
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the Executive's authority.7 Members of both houses have introduced
legislation to repeal the change.8
The congressional debate raises important questions about the
appropriate role of the military in a democratic society. To be clear, the
question posed is not whether to use armed force in certain situations
but what limitations there should be on that use. Since the founding of
the United States, it has been acknowledged, albeit reluctantly by
some,9 that the federal government may need to resort to armed force to
quash insurrections or execute federal law. 10  Presidents have
successfully used armed force in both situations, most notably during the
Civil War" and again to enforce desegregation. The struggle now, as it
was then, is to define the appropriate parameters of that use.
The struggle to define the appropriate role of the military in
domestic life comes at a critical juncture in our nation's development.
With an increased emphasis on homeland security following the 9/11
attack, the government and the public have yielded to the military's
growing involvement in domestic affairs.'3 Such acquiescence is not
surprising. Following 9/11, public confidence in the military reached
record highs.'4 But even before that, the U.S. military had consistently
7. Members of both the House and Senate perceive the amendment as inappropriately
enhancing Executive authority and have introduced legislation to repeal it. See S. 513, 110th
Cong. (2007); H.R. 869, 110th Cong. (2007); "The Insurrection Act Rider" and State Control of
the National Guard: Hearing on S. 513 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 38
(2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) ("As with so much else this
Administration has done, this is a raw expansion of Presidential power. It is certainly not an
expansion of power that should be granted without thoughtful deliberation, and without
extensive consideration of the far-reaching consequences."); id. at 27 (statement of Sen. Kit
Bond) ("These provisions reduce our nation's governors' control over their Guard units and
provide the President with unnecessary and unprecedented power.").
8. See S. 513, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 869, 110th Cong. (2007).
9. See George Mason, Speech to the Constitutional Convention (June 20, 1787), in THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 346, 349 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
[hereinafter George Mason Speech].
10. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1948).
11. Proclamation No. 3, 37 Stat. App. (Apr. 15, 1861).
12. Proclamation No. 3204, 3 C.F.R. 132 (1954-1958).
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL
SUPPORT iii (2005).
14. In 2002, the public's confidence in the military reached seventy-nine percent.
Andricka Hammonds, 2006 Gallup Poll, ARMY NEWS SERV., July 1, 2006, available at
http://usmilitary.about.com/od/theorderlyroom/a/poll2006.htm. That number was surpassed
in 2003, with eighty-two percent of the American public reporting "high confidence" in the
military. Id. A recent Gallup poll found that the public had the "most confidence" in the
military. Frank Newport, Americans' Confidence in Congress at All-Time Low, GALLUP
NEWS SERV., June 21, 2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/27946/Americans-Confidence-
2008] 1.029
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rated as the most trustworthy of public and private institutions-even
more trustworthy than churches, universities, hospitals, the U.S.
Supreme Court, and any other part of the government.'5 In the last two
decades, the military has been steadily used to aid law enforcement in a
variety of domestic situations.'6 The armed forces have been employed
in several different "civil support missions," from providing
humanitarian aid during natural disasters" to assisting with drug
interdiction' 8 to patrolling U.S. borders as part of the immigration
control effort.' 9 The government's and public's reliance on the military
is only magnified by concerns regarding another terrorist attack. The
line between civil disorder and national security-between domestic law
enforcement and military necessity-is continually blurred.2'
By increasing the military's presence in the domestic sphere,
however, the federal government is obscuring the traditional lines
between military and civilian roles.' Even when sanctioned by civil
leaders, the increased role of the armed forces in the domestic life
endangers civil liberties and the democratic process.22 Over fifty years
ago in his farewell address, President Eisenhower cautioned against civil
acquiescence to military control when he stated: "In the councils of
government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial
complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists
Congress-AliTime-Low.aspx.
15. DAVID C. KING & ZACHERY KARABELL, GENERATION OF TRUST: How THE U.S.
MILITARY HAS REGAINED THE PUBLIC'S CONFIDENCE SINCE VIETNAM 1 (2003).
16. Richard H. Kohn, Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 4
CHI. J. INT'L L. 165, 187 (2003); Kurt Andrew Schlicter, Comment, Locked and Loaded:
Taking Aim at the Growing Use of the American Military in Civilian Law Enforcement
Operations, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (1993).
17. Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
707, 102 Stat. 4689 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5201).
18. See Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905, 95
Stat. 1099, 1114-16 (1981) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378).
19. In June 2006, President Bush initiated "Operation Jump Start," which sent National
Guard members to the borders to support the Border Patrol. Steven Donald Smith,
'Operation Jump Start' Puts 2,500 Guardsmen on Southern Border in June, AM. FORCES
PRESS SERV., June 6, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=1610
9
.
20. See Kohn, supra note 16, at 187; Gene Healy, Deployed in the U.S.A.: The Creeping
Militarization of the Home Front, POL'Y ANALYSIS, at 9, Dec. 17, 2003, http://www.cato.org/
pubs/pas/pa503.pdf.
21. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the
U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 357 (1994) ("The transfer of public confidence
from the elected leaders to the military challenges civilian control of the armed forces.").
22. Id. at 342.
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and will persist." '  Even the courts have acknowledged the dangers
inherent in even a small military presence. 4 In addressing the use of
federal armed forces in response to a resistance movement on the
Wounded Knee Indian Reservation, the Eighth Circuit recognized that
the use of the military on even a small scale could "chill the exercise of
fundamental rights, such as the rights to speak freely and to vote, and
create the atmosphere of fear and hostility which exists in territories
occupied by enemy forces."25
It is essential that Congress engage in an open dialogue regarding
these issues. A fundamental tenet of our society, first reflected in the
Declaration of Independence, is the desire of civilian supremacy over
military power.26 It is premised on a well-founded fear of domestic
tyranny at the hands of a despotic leader with unbridled access to
military might.27 This tenet, inserted into the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, rests on the belief that the "military establishment is, of
course, a necessary organ of government; but the reach of its power
must be carefully limited lest the delicate balance between freedom and
order be upset., 2' By increasing a military presence in the domestic
sphere, the federal government is erasing the demarcation between
military and civilian roles and undermining the primacy of civil rule.29
But it is important to recognize that this is not a new topic of
discussion. The architects of the Constitution fiercely debated the role
of the military in domestic society.3" It was a subject of significant
controversy during the Constitutional Convention as well as the
ratification process.31 What emerged from this dialogue was a carefully
23. Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People, PUB. PAPERS 1035,
1038 (Jan. 17, 1961); see also, Dunlap, supra note 21, at 386 ("Without malice aforethought, a
political structure that may be subject to nefarious exploitation in the future is being
validated.").
24. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 18 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
25. Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted).
26. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776) ("[The King of Great
Britain] has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.").
27. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 115 (2005).
28. Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181,182 (1962).
29. See Dunlap, supra note 21, at 342.
30. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1948);
Essays of Brutus X, N.Y.J., Jan. 24, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
413 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
31. See Letter from the Hon. William Pierce, Esq., to St. George Tucker, Esq. (Sept. 28,
1787), in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
442, 445 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) ("I confess however that I am
at a loss to know whether any government can have sufficient energy to effect its own ends
2008] 1031
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constructed compromise and-consistent with the new government-a
shared power paradigm.3 2 As a starting point, to assuage the fears of
those opposed to a standing army, the proponents identified the
militia-the precursor to the National Guard-as the primary fighting
force in domestic situations.33 The architects of the Constitution created
a vertical check by dividing power over the militia between the states
and the federal government.34 Congress would have authority over the
militia's training and discipline, but the states would appoint the troop
commanders, thus ensuring militia loyalty to the states.35 In addition,
the militia would serve as an important check against the federal
government's ability to use a standing army to interfere with state
sovereignty. 36 It was contended that an army of citizen-soldiers would
be a bulwark against the federal government's inappropriate use of a
standing army.37
The founding generation also created a horizontal check within the
federal government by providing Congress, as representative of the
people, the authority to activate the militia to "execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrection and repel Invasions" and by allowing the
Executive to act as "Commander in Chief" of the militia when called
into service of the United States.38 On the federal level, it would take
the actions of both Congress and the Executive to employ the military
domestically, thereby decreasing the possibility of improper use."
While the various factions disagreed on the scope of the military's role
in domestic society, they all agreed that the regular army was an option
of last resort, to be used only when the civil authorities and militia had
without the aid of a military power. Some of the greatest men differ in opinion about this
point."); see also George Mason Speech, supra note 9, at 346 ("What, would you use military
force to compel the observance of a social compact? It is destructive to the rights of the
people. Do you.., mean a standing army? ... [It] may turn its arms against the government
which employs [it]."); Richard H. Kohn, The Constitution and National Security: The Intent of
the Framers, in THE UNITED STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789-1989, at 61, 67 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991).
32. See AMAR, supra note 27, at 117.
33. See ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN
DOMESTIC DISORDERS, 1789-1878, at 14-15 (1988).
34. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton),
supra note 30, at 137-38.
35. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30, at 140; AMAR, supra
note 27, at 116-17.
37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30, at 140.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; id. art. It, § 2, cl. 1.
39. See AMAR, supra note 27, at 115.
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failed. °
Unfortunately, today there is little left of this hard-fought
compromise. Congress has delegated excessive discretionary authority
to the Executive to use the military domestically." And, with the
transformation of the National Guard into an international fighting
force rather than a domestic security force, the federal government has
virtually wrested control of the Guard away from the states.
Congress's actions have slowly eroded the shared power paradigm
erected by the framing generation. 3 Other than the good will and good
sense of the Executive, there is little to protect the American public
from "the corrosive effect upon liberty of exaggerated military power."'
It remains an open question whether Congress's conduct in this area
is unconstitutional. Regardless of the legality, Congress's action raises
significant questions regarding the continued vitality of the Framers'
vision of the predominance of civil rule. The founding generation's
concerns regarding the use of the armed force in the domestic sphere
are as relevant today as they were in the eighteenth century. One need
not search hard for examples of how an increased reliance on the armed
forces to address domestic emergencies can have disastrous results.4 ' To
avoid similar problems, Congress must recreate the shared power
paradigm and act to limit the use of the federal armed forces for
domestic purposes. Returning to this paradigm would serve to constrain
Executive authority and to prevent the military from interfering with
civilian authority. As part of this effort, Congress should return the
National Guard to its traditional role as a domestic security force and
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30; see also Kohn,
supra note 16, at 168.
41. See infra Part III.B.
42. See infra Part IV.
43. See infra Part III.
44. Warren, supra note 28, at 182; see also Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse
Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding
Before Any More Damage Is Done, 175 MIL. L. REV. 86, 181 (2003) (commenting that the
"lack of genuine control has frequently left American citizens at the mercy of the military's
and executive branch's good judgment with respect to civil liberties").
45. It has long been recognized that military rule often comes on the heels of perceived
emergency conditions. See DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL
SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 2 (1997) (opining that the use
of the emergency power section of the Weimar Constitution was "a crucial moment in the
breakdown of Germany's first experiment with democracy"); Bernadette Meyler, Economic
Emergency and the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 545 (2007); see also PAUL H.
LEWIS, GUERRILLAS AND GENERALS: THE "DIRTY WAR" IN ARGENTINA (2002)
(describing the multiple military based regimes of twentieth century Argentina).
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provide the states with increased authority over its deployment
domestically.
This Article exposes the erosion of the horizontal and vertical checks
on the Executive's power to deploy the military domestically to execute
the laws and quash public disorder. Up to this point, no scholar has
addressed the corrosion of both structural protections. Scholarship has
tended to be myopic, focusing on either one or the other, thus failing to
reveal the full effect of Congress's conduct. 6 It begins by briefly
describing the historical bases for the founding generation's mistrust of
an executive with unbridled access to a military force. Next, it identifies
the structural protections that were placed in the Constitution in
response to these concerns, placing special emphasis on congressional
control. In Part III, it describes the erosion of the structural checks,
focusing first on the federalism issues and the disappearing militia and
then turns to the division of power between Congress and the Executive.
It offers a startling picture of how, over the last two-plus centuries,
significant discretionary power has been delegated to the Executive
Branch. Finally, Part IV offers a proposal that recognizes the dangers
inherent in the introduction of military force into civilian society and
attempts to restore the checks originally envisioned by the founders
while still providing adequate flexibility to respond to modern day
exigencies. The proposal is intended to be a starting point for a dialogue
regarding the appropriate role of the armed force in a democratic
society.
II. IN THE BEGINNING
To appreciate the current debate, it is important to understand its
origins. An historical review provides an important lens through which
to view the current framework. It is difficult to appreciate how far the
government has gravitated away from its ideological beginnings until the
bases for its original decisions are examined.
46. See generally Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadow, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 87 (2002) (examining executive power); Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory
Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169 (2006) (same); Reid Skibell, Separation-of-Powers
and the Commander in Chief- Congress's Authority to Override Presidential Decisions in Crisis
Situations, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183 (2004) (same); Adam M. Giuliano, Emergency
Federalism: Calling on the States in Perilous Times, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341 (2007)
(examining federalism issues); Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the
National Guard, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 919 (1988) (same); John F. Romano, State Militias and the
United States: Changed Responsibilities for a New Era, 56 A.F. L. REV. 233 (2005) (same);
Patrick Todd Mullins, Note, The Militia Clauses, The National Guard, and Federalism: A
Constitutional Tug of War, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 328 (1988) (same).
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The framing generation's political ideologies were shaped in a
society where the monarch's access to and control of a standing army
provided a continual threat to civil liberties. 7 European history was
littered with examples of the monarch's misuse of the armed forces to
suspend civilian rule, quell internal dissent, quash individual liberties,
and enforce imperial edicts. 8 As a result, the Founders worked hard to
avoid the pitfalls of the English monarchy and to establish a government
of laws, not of men. 9 To achieve this goal, they questioned the necessity
of a standing army as well as the propriety of using armed force to
execute the laws and quash internal dissent. During the formation of
the new government, three main questions needed to be answered: what
would be the composition of the young country's armed forces; how
would their use be controlled; and how would they be used, if at all, in
domestic situations? While there were certainly heated debates on all
three questions, the Framers did agree on one issue-the Executive
should not have unbridled access to a standing army. To prevent the
military excesses of the British monarchy, the new government would
disperse control of the armed forces within the central government,
thereby reducing the opportunity for abuse.
A. Shared Power and the Domestic Use of Armed Forces
in the Constitution
The colonists' fears regarding the misuse of a standing army greatly
influenced the early ideas regarding the formation of the new
government." Thus, when creating the Articles of Confederation, the
nascent government erred on the side of caution. While it was
recognized that the fledgling country needed access to some kind of
armed force, the Articles of Confederation provided the central
government with little power over those forces." Under the Articles,
47. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW: THE STANDING-ARMY
CONTROVERSY, THE TWO CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 4, 86-87 (1981); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 42 (1972).
48. See David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of
Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1971); see also Essays of Brutus
X, supra note 30, at 413 (reminding the people of New York of the excesses of Julius Caesar).
49. AMAR, supra note 27, at 115 (comparing the dispersal of power within the new
government with what existed under the British monarchy).
50. See Kohn, supra note 31, at 68-69; COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 14-15.
51. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (providing no enforcement power to
the central government).
10352008]
1036 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [91:1027
the government's coercive power rested primarily with the states. 52
The central government's military impotence became painfully
apparent during Shay's Rebellion.53 The local militia was either unable
or perhaps unwilling to quell the revolt." The central government was
similarly powerless to address the insurgency, lacking both the
bureaucratic structure to enlist the necessary men and the money with
which to pay them.55 The rebellion laid bare the inadequacies of the
Articles of Confederation and offered evidence to some that the state
militias could neither ensure domestic peace nor protect the borders
from foreign enemies.56
Based on their recent experiences under the Articles of
Confederation, many members attending the Constitutional Convention
acknowledged that the federal government needed the power to deal
with eruptions similar to Shay's Rebellion.57  Thus, one of the
fundamental goals of the Convention was to create a union capable of
securing internal order.5 8 Consequently, the question of the federal
52. See id. art. V. Under the Articles, each state remained sovereign, free, and
independent with the sole power to tax and to raise armed forces. See id. art. II ("Each State
retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence .... ); id. art. VII ("When land-forces are
raised by any State for the common defence .... ); id. art. VIII ("The taxes for paying that
proportion [of property value in the State to the Treasury] shall be laid and levied by the
authority and direction of the Legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon
by the United States...."). While the central government could request troops and money,
it could do so only if nine of the thirteen states represented in Congress assented, a
requirement that was difficult to meet. See id. art. X. Even when Congress did summon the
votes, there was no guarantee that the states would honor it. See id. art. XIII. Moreover,
when it came to the use of armed forces during peacetime, to patrol the interior of the
country, or to guard leftover arms and stores, Congress was not even certain it possessed the
authority to make such a request. See Kohn, supra note 31, at 69.
53. See COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 4-6.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 7.
57. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; Letter from Edward Carrington to Edmund Randolph,
Governor of Virginia (Dec. 8, 1786), in 8 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 516, 517 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1963) ("[H]ere is felt the imbecility, the futility,
the nothingness of the federal powers; the U.S. have no troops, nor dare they call into action,
what is called the only safe guard of a free government, the Militia of the State, it being
composed of the very objects of the force .... ).
58. See Letter of His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esquire, on the Federal
Constitution (Oct. 10, 1787), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 123, 123 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984)
(expressing a desire that the United States Constitution ought to be "a shield against foreign
hostility, and a firm resort against domestic commotion"); Letter from Edward Carrington,
supra note 57, at 517 ("[H]ere is felt the imbecility, the futility, the nothingness of the federal
powers; the U.S. have no troops, nor dare they call into action, what is called the only safe
2008] TOWARD MILITARY RULE? 1037
government's power to use the armed forces to ensure domestic
tranquility was a topic of significant debate. 9
But the question was more complicated under the proposed
constitution. Unlike the Articles of Confederation, the draft
constitution contained an Executive with distinct duties and
responsibilities. 6° The Articles had simply divided power between the
states and central government with the states receiving the lion's share
of control over the use of the armed forces domestically.6' With the shift
away from a state-dominated government, Convention participants had
to determine how to divide the power on the federal level between
Congress and the Executive.
While it was generally accepted that a mechanism to ensure internal
order was necessary,62 the Convention members still maintained a
fundamental distrust of a standing army, and more specifically, an
executive's ability to employ armed force to quell internal dissent.63 As
a result, it was expected that the state militias would be the primary
guard of a free government, the Militia of the State, it being composed of the very objects of
the force ...."); see also Kohn, supra note 31, at 66 ("The last, but also a highly important
security problem, was the maintenance of internal order."); Jason Mazzone, The Security
Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29,60 (2005).
59. See Letter from the Hon. William Pierce, supra note 31, at 445 ("I confess however
that I am at a loss to know whether any government can have sufficient energy to effect its
own ends without the aid of a military power. Some of the greatest men differ in opinion
about this point."); George Mason Speech, supra note 9, at 346. ("What, would you use
military force to compel the observance of a social compact? It is destructive to the rights of
the people. Do you.., mean a standing army?... [It] may turn its arms against the
government which employs [it]."); see also Kohn, supra note 31, at 67; Jonathan Turley, The
Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2002).
60. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V (describing only congressional
power within central government), with U.S. CONST. art. II (outlining Executive Branch's
powers and responsibilities).
61. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art V.
62. See, e.g., Debate in the the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 311, 319 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter
Virginia Convention Debate] (comments of Edmund Randolph) ("What remedy then could
be provided?-Leave the country defenceless?"); see also COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 7
("With few exceptions the convention delegates accepted the premise that the new national
government must possess a coercive power that the Confederation had lacked and that it
must be capable of exercising this power in its own right without having to rely on the state
governments.").
63. See Virginia Convention Debate, supra note 62, at 319 ("With respect to a standing
army, I believe there was not a member in the federal convention who did not feel
indignation at such an institution."); COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 14 ("That no power to use
regular forces in domestic disorders was explicitly granted to either the president or Congress
was testimony to the fear of standing armies that pervaded the meeting.").
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coercive tool when civil authorities failed. 64 Working within these
political realities, the early ratification debates focused on the dispersion
of control over the state militias and the propriety of using armed force
generally to execute the laws and quash insurrection, as well as the
necessity of a peacetime standing army.
The Federalist and Anti-Federalist writings frame the positions of
those closest to the debate. 5 As a general matter, the Anti-Federalists
were vehemently opposed to the allowance of a peacetime standing
army and specifically with the central government's authority to raise
one. 66  The Anti-Federalists were equally opposed to the central
government's control over the state militias, believing that federal
control would lead to their neglect and eventual decay.67 For the Anti-
Federalist, the states' control over their individual militias established an
important check against a powerful central government-especially one
with access to a standing army-and provided a guarantee of the states'
continued sovereignty.'
64. See Virginia Convention Debate, supra note 62, at 319 ("It is left to the militia who
will suffer if they become the instruments of tyranny. The general government must have
power to call them forth when the general defence requires it."); THE FEDERALIST No. 29
(Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30, at 137 ("The power of regulating the militia, and of
commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion, are natural incidents to the
duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the
confederacy.").
65. See COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 15 (noting the arguments between the two sides had
"particular vigor whenever the issue of the use of military force to execute federal law and
suppress domestic insurrection was raised").
66. See Essays of Brutus VIII, N.Y.J., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 405, 406 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); Essays of Brutus X, supra note 30,
at 413; Luther Martin, Address to the Maryland Legislature at the Proceedings of the General
Convention (Nov. 29, 1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
172, 207 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
[Tjhe Congress have also the power given them to raise and support
armies, without any limitation as to numbers, and without any restriction
in time of peace. Thus, Sir, this plan of government, instead of guarding
against a standing army, that engine of arbitrary power, which has so often
and so successfully been used for the subversion of freedom, has in its
formation given it an express and constitutional sanction, and hath
provided for its introduction; nor could this be prevented.
Id.
67. See Patrick Henry, Speech at the Virginia State Ratifying Convention (June 5, 1788),
reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 211, 218 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)
("By this, Sir, you see that their control over our last and best defence, is unlimited. If they
neglect or refuse to discipline or arm our militia, they will be useless: The States can do
neither, this power being exclusively given to Congress.").
68. See id.; Essays of Brutus I, N.Y.J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
TOWARD MILITARY RULE?
The Anti-Federalists, however, were not ignorant of the need for the
federal government to use force to suppress insurrections.6 ' But the
issue was more complex and reflected broader concerns about the
appropriate distribution of power between the state and federal
governments as well as the type of military force the federal government
could employ.7° Accordingly, the militia-not a standing army-should
be the source of domestic armed force, and the states should retain
primary control of the use of the militia.7'
In contrast, the Federalists' arguments began with the assumption
that "there might some times be a necessity to make use of a force
constituted differently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the
community, and to maintain the just authority of the laws against those
violent invasions of them, which amount to insurrections and
rebellions. 7 2  The Federalists, however, were sensitive to the fears
wrought by the existence of a standing army in peacetime. Several
essays attempted to soothe these fears by pointing to the implicit and
explicit checks contained within the proposed constitution to counter
the potential degradation of liberty at the hands of a standing army."
Two checks are relevant here. First, Congress, as representative of
the people, would control the establishment and use of a standing
army. The Federalists attempted to temper concerns about the federal
army as a tool of tyranny by pointing to the power of the Legislature-
not the Executive-to raise, support, and activate the military.75  In
ANTI-FEDERALIST 363, 370 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); Essays of Brutus X, supra note 30,
at 413.
69. See Essays of Brutus I, supra note 68, at 370 ("The magistrates in every government
must be supported in the execution of the laws, either by an armed force, maintained at the
public expence for that purpose; or by the people turning out to aid the magistrate upon his
command, in case of resistance.").
70. See Essays of Brutus IX, N.Y.J., Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 408, 409 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); Federal Farmer, Letter No. 2, Oct. 9,
1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 230, 232-33 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981).
71. See Essays of Brutus IX, supra note 70, at 409; Patrick Henry, supra note 67, at 218.
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 135.
73. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 10, at 136; THE
FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 34, at 140.
74. See THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 115 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1948)
("[T]he whole power of raising armies was lodged in the legislature, not in the executive.");
THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 127 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1948) (noting that
the Legislature "[is] not at liberty to vest in the executive department, permanent funds for
the support of an army").
75. See THE FEDERALIST No. 24 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 74, at 115;
Mazzone, supra note 58, at 73 ("Armies only became problematic if they escaped the control
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contrast to the Congress, the Executive was provided with the limited
role of Commander in Chief; a function that gave him control over the
forces primarily when activated by Congress.76
Second, the existence of a "well-regulated militia" controlled by the
states but available to the federal government would counter the need
to employ the standing army to quash public disorder and enforce the
laws.7 7  In The Federalist No. 29, Alexander Hamilton argued that
empowering the central government to organize, arm, and discipline the
state militias, as well as press them into federal service, would serve to
lessen the need to acquire and employ a large standing army.78
Moreover, according to Hamilton, a standing army is less a threat to
liberty when there is a large body of trained citizens who would stand
ready to defend the rights of their fellow citizens.79 Finally, according to
the Federalists, any argument that the federal government's ability to
prescribe regulations for the militia or to press them into service
somehow results in the militia being potential tools of tyranny was
countered by the fact that the states had the sole and exclusive power to
appoint the militia's officers. 80
In addition to the explicit checks within the proposed constitution,
the Federalists contended that the employment of the standing army
domestically would be an option of last resort.8 It was understood that
the government would first rely on the civil authorities with the aid of
of the people's elected representatives .... ).
76. See COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 14; H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL,
THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT
77 (2002).
77. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30, at 140.
Although it is not often discussed, the proposed constitution also explicitly recognized the
states' power to use the militia in an emergency role. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (providing
that a State may engage in war if "actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay").
78. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30, at 140;
Mazzone, supra note 58, at 67 ("Preventing abuses by a national army therefore required
giving the national government power to employ militiamen for security purposes so it would
not be tempted to deploy federal troops instead.").
79. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30, at 140.
80. See id. at 140-41 ("If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia,
upon any conceivable establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the
officers being in the appointment of the states, ought at once to extinguish it. There can be
no doubt that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating influence over
the militia."); Mullins, supra note 46, at 331.
81. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 30, at 138;
COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 14-15.
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the posse comitatus12 and then the militia before it would use the regular
army to execute the laws of the Union to establish internal order.83
The three questions that framed the debate were thus answered.
The young country's armed forces would be comprised of a standing
army (and navy) as well as the state militias when called into federal
service."4 The Framers dispersed power over the country's military
between Congress, the states, and the Executive.85 Congress would have
the power to raise and regulate the army and navy, as well as to
organize, arm, and discipline the state militias. 6 The states retained
control of the militia when not in federal service, and the Constitution
"reserv[ed] to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress."87 While the Executive was identified as the
"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and
of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of
the United States," what that role entailed was not specified.88
It was also decided that the federal government should have the
authority to enforce federal law and quash internal dissent, like Shay's
Rebellion, with armed force. Congress was given the authority to
"provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions., 89  Thus, the Executive's
authority to command the militia in domestic emergencies was
dependent upon congressional action. 9° Notably, the Constitution did
82. Posse comitatus is defined as the "power of the country." It was based on the
concept that a domestic law enforcement officer, such as a civil magistrate, could call on all
able-bodied male citizens to aid in the execution of the law. See Engdahl, supra note 48, at 4-
6 (describing the historical origins of the posse comitatus).
83. See COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 19; Kohn, supra note 31, at 74-75; AMAR, supra
note 27, at 118.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13,15.
85. Id.; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 76, at 76-78; AMAR, supra
note 27, at 117 ("By balancing military power between two levels of government, the
American people would in theory retain greater control over both."); see also Brannon P.
Denning, Palladium of Liberty? Causes and Consequences of the Federalization of State
Militias in the Twentieth Century, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 191, 204-06 (1996) (discussing
the Second Amendment and its relationship to the central government's control over the
state militias).
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 15, 16.
87. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
88. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
89. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
90. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that the President is Commander in Chief of the militia
"when called into the actual Service of the United States").
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not explicitly provide for the government to use the federal armed
forces in the same manner. 9' As a result, whether the regular army, as
opposed to the federalized militia, could be used to respond to domestic
emergencies was arguably left ambiguous. As a general matter,
however, there was "a consensus that the militia would be used by the
federal government in only those instances where civil law should
completely fail and that, at all odds, the creation and use of a standing
army to control the people was the greatest danger to be avoided."
2
B. Modern Military Composition
A brief primer on the composition of the modern military provides a
sneak preview of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the last two
centuries and provides an important foundation for the subsequent
discussion. It is no longer possible to neatly divide the United States
military into the federal armed forces, the so-called standing army, and
the militias that remained under state control unless called into federal
service in the narrow circumstances described in the Constitution. The
distinction between the two forces has become increasingly difficult to
divine.
After the Vietnam War, President Ford ended the draft and
Congress began to downsize the standing military force.93 To meet its
military commitments, as well as budgetary constraints, the federal
government created an all-voluntary military composed of active-duty
forces and a large Reserve component. '  The Reserve forces are a
combination of the state-based National Guard units and the newly
minted Reserve units, mainly comprised of retired active-duty
servicemembers that maintain their civilian status until called into
service. 9 As the name suggests, the Reserve components supplement
the regular forces only when necessary. 96 In theory, the new model-
91. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (explicitly allows for calling forth the militia in domestic
situations but is silent regarding the federal armed forces); id. art. II (failing to explicitly
provide the Executive branch the authority to deploy the military domestically).
92. COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 19; see also UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 76, at 74-
75.
93. Proclamation No. 4360, 3 C.F.R. 462 (1971-1975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. App. 453,
347 (2006).
94. See Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., pt. 7, at 623 (1986); Andrew P. Morriss, The
Public-Private Security Partnership: Counterterrorism Considerations for Employers in a Post-
9/11 World, 2 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 427, 433-34 (2006).
95. 10 U.S.C. §§ 101(c)(1)-(7), 10101 (2006).
96. Id. § 10103.
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called the "Total Force" concept-would allow the federal government
to decrease defense costs while still maintaining a well-trained military
force capable of responding to security demands.97
The Total Force concept has not only altered the composition of the
military, it has also muddied the constitutional power structure. When
the Framers dispersed power over the new government's military force,
the forces were clearly divided between the standing army, controlled by
the federal government, and the militia, under the command of the state
government unless called into federal service. But the National Guard,
the modern day militia, is no longer just under the command of the
states. As will be discussed more fully below, National Guard members
must take a dual oath to both the governor of the state in which they
serve as well as the President of the United States as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces. 98 Because National Guard members are
considered a part of the Reserve forces, they are by definition a part of
the federal armed forces.'
The integration of the National Guard into the federal armed forces
also makes discussion about the constitutional power structure difficult.
The Guard's dual role raises serious questions about the continued
vitality of the distinction between the standing army and militia the
Framers thought so significant to the maintenance of liberty. Through
congressional fiat, the Executive commands both the standing army and
the National Guard.'00 As will be discussed in the subsequent section,
one wonders if Congress has gone too far in providing the Executive
control of both forces with the discretionary power to use either in the
domestic sphere.
III. EROSION OF THE SHARED POWER PARADIGM
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the founding generation
carefully considered the role of the armed forces in domestic society and
created a constitutional framework to regulate its use. Unfortunately,
97. See Christopher Behan, The Integrated Active and Reserve Division: Background,
Legal Foundation, and the Role of Judge Advocates, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2003, at 1, 1-2.
98. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
99. 10 U.S.C. §§ 101(c)(1)-(4), 10101, 10103 ("Whenever Congress determines that more
units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular
components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and
the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together
with units of other reserve components necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to
active duty and retained as long as so needed.").
100. See infra Part III.A.
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today there is little left of this hard-fought compromise. Both the
vertical and horizontal checks have slowly eroded. First, Congress has
largely replaced the state militias with the National Guard, a fighting
force that must take an oath to serve two commanders in chief, the
governor and the President, and who is largely trained, disciplined,
funded and controlled by the federal government."' The transformation
of the militia from a largely state-based operation to a critical
component of the federal armed forces has adversely affected the
division of power between the state and federal governments."° It has
also interfered with the states' ability to utilize the Guard in domestic
emergencies. The Guard's immersion into the federal armed forces
combined with the congressional delegation of authority to the
President has created the very scenario the Founders sought to avoid-it
has placed nearly unrestrained access and control of a military force in
the hands of the Executive.
Second, Congress has delegated enormous discretionary authority to
the President to use the armed forces domestically, diluting the shared
powers paradigm embedded in the Constitution.' °3  Congress has
essentially removed itself from the decision-making process, allowing
the Executive nearly unchecked power to deploy armed forces in
domestic situations.
A. The Erosion of State Control of the Militia
Congress has all but eliminated the vertical check envisioned by the
Framers-the shared control of the militia between the states and
federal government." This erosion occurred primarily in response to
changes in the geopolitical landscape at the turn of the twentieth
century. 05 To address new national security concerns, Congress relied
on its long-dormant power to organize, arm, and discipline the militia
and remade the state militias into an international fighting force."° In so
101. See infra note 134 and accompanying text
102. The National Guard's integration into the federal armed forces was completed with
the adoption of the "Total Force" policy. Behan, supra note 97, at 1-2. Under this doctrine,
a smaller regular army is augmented by Reserve and National Guard forces. Id. Thus, any
major military engagement requires the mobilization and deployment of National Guard
units. Id.
103. See infra Part III.A.
104. See supra Part II.A.
105. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 181,196-97 (1940).
106. Id. at 195.
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doing, it undermined one of the identified checks against the perceived
dangers of a standing army. State militias, once viewed as an important
constraint on the federal government's misuse of a standing army, 7
were essentially merged with the federal forces.0 8 Along with this
merger, Congress increased the federal government's control over the
forces and the states' control over their use was gradually diminished."9
Additionally, the merger had the unintended consequence of interfering
with the militia's identified role as the states' and the nation's domestic
security force.
As part of the original Militia Act of 1792, Congress provided a basic
framework for the militia system but largely relied on the states to
implement its requirements. The Act stipulated that all eligible males
must arm themselves according to statutory requirements and be
available to defend the state and the nation. " Congress required states
to appoint adjutant generals to oversee the militias and to report
annually to their respective governors and to the President."' It relied
on the states to implement the organizational structure laid out in the
statute. Congress provided no financial assistance, no federally
standardized training, and no federally supervised training, nor was
there any mechanism for federal enforcement of the Act's
requirements." 2 The Militia Act requirements remained unchanged for
111 years.
The conversion from a primarily state-controlled entity began in
1903 when Congress passed the Dick Act,"3 which transformed the state
militias into the National Guard." 4 The Act divided the militia into two
107. See supra Part II.A.
108. Romano, supra note 46, at 243; see also Kohn, supra note 16, at 167.
109. Mullins, supra note 46, at 339 ("[M]any of the states have ceded virtually all of their
authority to federal control, a wholesale retreat from the state-controlled character of the
militia that had once prevailed."); id. at 343 ("State control in administering matters such as
training, personnel, logistics, doctrine, and military justice has been eliminated by a system of
federal conditional spending."); Nathan Zezula, Note, The BRAC Act, the State Militia
Charade, and the Disregard of Original Intent, 27 PACE L. REV. 365, 367 (2007).
110. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271.
111. Id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 273.
112. See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 76, at 113.
113. Dick Act, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903) (repealed 1956); Denning, supra note 85, at
217 (identifying the Dick Act as the beginning of the "demise" of the state controlled militia
system).
114. Dick Act, ch. 196, § 1, 32 Stat. at 775 (differentiating between the "militia" and the
"National Guard"). Some historians point to the militias' failures before the Spanish
American War as the true starting point for its demise, especially in the War of 1812. See
UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 76, at 119-20; Wiener, supra note 105, at 188-90 (describing
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classes: the "organized militia" to be known as the National Guard units
and an "unorganized militia" consisting of the remaining able-bodied
male population. "5 At the same time, Congress provided the National
Guard with increased federal funding in exchange for, among other
things, conforming to the federal army's standards of training and
preparation."1
6
Under the Act, however, the National Guard remained a domestic
security force. The legislative history of the Act signaled that Congress
intended that the Guard services would "'be rendered only upon the soil
of the United States or of its Territories.""' .'7 Moreover, the Supreme
Court recognized that the Act was passed pursuant to the Militia Clause
power, thus limiting its territorial reach."8
Congress sought to bypass these territorial restrictions when it
passed the Militia Act of 1908."' Under this Act, the National Guard
could be federalized and sent overseas.'2" It was the first move away
from the militia's traditional role as a defensive force to be used only in
domestic emergencies. The Militia Act was never utilized, however, as
both the Judge Advocate General of the Army and the Attorney
General deemed its international reach unconstitutional.' 2 ' The Militia
Clauses contained only three instances in which the militia could be
called-"to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions."' 22 Thus, there was no basis for sending the National
Guard to fight outside the confines of the United States.'23
Shortly before the United States' entrance into World War I,
Congress successfully avoided the territorial limitations in the Militia
Clause when it passed the National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA). 24 The
NDA authorized the President to draft members of the National Guard
the failure of the militia during the War of 1812).
115. Dick Act, ch. 196, § 1, 32 Stat. at 775.
116. Id. §§ 13-20, 32 Stat. at 777-79 (describing the issuance of funds, arms, and the
training requirements for the National Guard).
117. Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 342 (1990) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1094,
57th Cong., at 22 (1902)).
118. Id.
119. Militia Act of 1908, ch. 204, § 4, 35 Stat. 399, 400.
120. Id. (amending section 5 of the Dick Act to allow the President to order the militia
to serve "either within or without the territory of the United States").
121. See Wiener, supra note 105, at 197-98.
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
123. See id.; Wiener, supra note 105, at 198.
124. National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166.
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and the Reserves, thereby integrating them into the regular army."'
Using conscription, a Guard member could serve abroad, bringing an
end to the domestic soil only requirement that had followed the state
militias since the Republic's inception. 126 Because Congress used the
War Power Clause, and not the Militia Clause, there were no
constitutional concerns.'27
The NDA's conscription provision served to decimate the state
militias.'28 Under the NDA, Guard members would, "from the date of
their draft, stand discharged from the militia" while in the service of the
United States. 29 Unfortunately, the NDA never provided for the Guard
member's continued service to the state once he was discharged from
federal service.' 3° The NDA also dramatically increased federal control
over the National Guard.13' While the states received more federal
funding, they also were required to meet new federal requirements.1
32
The President was allowed to dictate the number and kind of units each
state had to maintain, 3 3 and the Act replaced state codes with the
National Military Code. 3 1 In addition, it required every member of the
National Guard to take a dual oath, to support the nation as well as the
states and to obey the President as well as the governor.
131
The NDA also subtly undermined another one of the checks placed
in the Constitution to ensure militia loyalty to the states. While the
Constitution explicitly reserves to the states "the Appointment of the
Officers,"'136 the NDA required Guard units receiving federal funding to
obtain federal approval before appointing any officer to a Guard
125. Id. § 111, 39 Stat. at 211.
126. Mullins, supra note 46, at 336.
127. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 368 (1918).
128. Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990).
129. National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, § 111, 39 Stat. at 211 ("All persons so
drafted shall, from the date of their draft, stand discharged from the militia ....").
130. See id. (failing to provide for reinstatement once federal service was over).
131. See Wiener, supra note 105, at 200 ("The scope of federal control authorized by the
1916 Act completely transformed the Guard."); Mullins, supra note 46, at 334-35 ("The result
[of the 1916 Act] was a dramatic increase in federal control over the militia.").
132. See, e.g., National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, § 67, 39 Stat. at 199 (describing
funding); id. § 91, 39 Stat. at 206 (requiring discipline to conform to regular Army); id. § 92,
39 Stat. at 206 (mandating training).
133. Id. § 60, 39 Stat. at 197 ("And the President may prescribe the particular unit or
units, as to branch or arm of service, to be maintained in each State, Territory, or the District
of Columbia .... ).
134. Id. §§ 102-108, 39 Stat. at 208-09 (current version at 32 U.S.C. §§ 323-333).
135. Id. § 70, 39 Stat. at 201 (current version at 32 U.S.C. § 304).
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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command.137 To be recognized as an officer, the individual had to meet
the requirements set forth by the Secretary of Defense and pass an
examination administered by the federal armed forces. 38  Thus, the
governor no longer had absolute control over the appointment of
officers in the state militia; his choices were subject to a federal veto.
The National Guard Act of 1933139 (NGA) essentially completed the
Guard's merger with the federal armed forces. In part, the NGA was an
attempt to fix the damage caused by the "discharge" component of the
1916 Act.'" Under the NGA, a Guard member could be called to
federal service as a member of the regular armed forces but upon
release from federal service would remain a member of the state's
National Guard.14' The Act also created the Reserve components of the
United States Armed Forces. 142  With the creation of the Reserve
component, Congress allowed the President to bypass the restrictions of
the Militia Clause, avoid the conscription requirements contained in the
previous statute, and call the Reserves to active duty whenever
necessary.13  Thus, the state militias existed only when the federal
government did not need them as part of the federal armed forces.
The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952'" continued to enhance the
President's power to use the National Guard for federal purposes. For
the first time, the President could call out the Guard for any reason, thus
bypassing the need for an identified necessity. 145 The President's power
was cabined, however, by the need for gubernatorial consent.'
4 6
137. National Defense Act of 1916, ch. 134, §§ 74-75, 39 Stat. at 201-02 (current version
at 32 U.S.C. §§ 305-307).
138. Id. § 75, 39 Stat. 202 (current version at 32 U.S.C. § 307).
139. National Guard Act of 1933, ch. 87, 48 Stat. 153 (current version in scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C. and 32 U.S.C.).
140. See id. § 18, 48 Stat. at 160 (amending section 111 of the 1916 Act).
141. Id.
142. Id. §§ 1, 3-5, 48 Stat. at 153-55. Any individual who entered the National Guard
was automatically a member of the Reserves. See id. § 4 ("All persons appointed officers in
the National Guard of the United States are reserve officers and shall be commissioned in the
Army of the United States."); id. § 5 ("The National Guard ... shall be a reserve component
of the Army of the United States ...."). In short, when an individual enlisted in the National
Guard, he automatically became a part of the National Guard of the United States. As a
member of the National Guard of the United States, he automatically became a member of
the reserve component of the federal armed forces. See id. § 9, 48 Stat. at 157.
143. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301, 12304 (2006).
144. Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, ch. 608, 66 Stat. 481.
145. Id. § 233(c), 66 Stat. at 490 (repealed).
146. Id. § 233(d).
"A member of a reserve component may, by competent authority, be
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Presumably the gubernatorial veto provision was intended to protect the
structural checks embedded in the Constitution by providing the states
with some vestige of power over the Guard. By requiring the President
to obtain the consent of the governor before federalizing the state's
National Guard units, Congress maintained a small piece of the shared
powers paradigm envisioned by the Founders.
In 1986, Congress severely restricted this last remnant of state power
when it passed the Montgomery Amendment. 47  The Amendment
provided that a governor was precluded from withholding consent
"because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of
such active duty." 14 8  Shortly after its enactment, the Governor of
Minnesota sought an injunction preventing portions of the Minnesota
National Guard from being0 sent on a training mission to Central
America. 149
The Supreme Court swiftly dashed any attempts by the states to
maintain control over National Guard deployments. In Perpich v.
Department of Defense, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
the Montgomery Amendment violated the Militia Clause because it
allowed the Guard to be used in nonemergency conditions and for
foreign service.' The Court surmised the Militia Clause authorized
Congress to provide for the disciplining of the militia and "[i]f the
discipline required for effective service in the Armed Forces of a global
power requires training in distant lands, or distant skies, Congress has
the authority to provide it.''.
The Court similarly disposed of the governor's argument that this
interpretation of the Militia Clause would have "the practical effect of
nullifying an important state power that is expressly reserved in the
ordered to active duty or active duty for training at any time with his
consent: Provided, That no member of the National Guard of the United
States or Air National Guard of the United States shall be so ordered
without the consent of the Governor or other appropriate authority of the
State, Territory, or District of Columbia concerned."
Id.
147. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,
§ 522, 100 Stat. 3816, 3871 (1986) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 672).
148. Id.
149. Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 666 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn. 1987). Governor Michael
Dukakis of Massachusetts also brought an action seeking a declaration that the Montgomery
Amendment was unconstitutional. See Dukakis v. Dep't of Def., 686 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass.
1988).
150. 496 U.S. 334, 354 (1990).
151. Id. at 350.
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Constitution."'1 2  According to the Court, its interpretation merely
"recognize[d] the supremacy of federal power in the area of military
affairs," and the Court further noted that "[t]he Federal Government
provides virtually all of the funding, the materiel, and the leadership for
the State Guard units." 153 Moreover, a state is allowed to provide and
maintain at its own expense a defense force that is exempt from being
drafted into the Armed Forces of the United States. 154
The recent amendment to the Insurrection Act has been heralded as
yet another shift of power from the states to the Executive Branch.
Because it allows the President to federalize and utilize the National
Guard without the consultation or consent of the states, the National
Governors Association described the change as "an unprecedented shift
in authority from governors as Commanders and Chief of the Guard to
the federal government." 5 Major General Timothy Lowenberg echoed
these sentiments when he testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. In his written statement, he testified:
Without any hearing or consultation with the governors
and without any articulation or justification of need,
Section 1076 of the 2007 NDAA changed more than 100
years of well-established and carefully balanced state-
federal and civil-military relationships. One hundred
years of law and policy were changed without any
publicly or privately acknowledged author or proponent
of the change. As written, the Act does not require the
President to contact, confer or collaborate in any way
with a governor before seizing control of a state's
National Guard forces. It requires only notice to
Congress that the President has taken the action but no
explanation, justification or consent of Congress is
required. 156
In theory, the National Guard is a state entity under the control and
direction of the governor. Governors rely on the Guard to work in
concert with first responders to address local emergencies and security
152. Id. at 351.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 352; see 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006).
155. Nat'l Governors Association Letter, supra note 3.
156. Hearing, supra note 7, at 42-43 (Statement of Maj. Gen. Timothy Lowenberg,
Adjutant General, State of Washington).
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issues.157 But through a series of statutory maneuvers, including the
Insurrection Act amendment, Congress has undermined the National
Guard's primary function.
The Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990158 (BRAC Act)
represents a new chapter in the struggle to maintain some semblance of
state control over the National Guard.159 The purpose of the BRAC Act
is to "'close or realign military installations that create an unnecessary
drain on the economic resources of the Department of Defense."" ° In
May 2005, then-Secretary Rumsfeld submitted a list of proposed
changes and realignments that not only closed National Guard bases but
also effectively reorganized National Guard units.16 1 In several states,
Secretary Rumsfeld recommended reorganizing, or in extreme cases,
"deactivating" entire Air National Guard units and moving all the unit's
aircraft to other states.' 62  The states' reactions and subsequent court
decisions provide a preview of the new front in the battle for control of
the National Guard.
Governors in the affected states protested, claiming that Secretary
Rumsfeld's order was an infringement on their statutory right to
approve all changes in the organization of Guard units within their
borders. 63 Although several governors filed suit and sought temporary
injunctions," only two district courts directly addressed the arguments
advanced.'65 The Governor of Pennsylvania, Edward Rendell, and the
state's two Senators, Arlen Specter and Rick Santorum, challenged the
157. Id. at 30 (Statement of Michael F. Easley, Governor of North Carolina).
158. 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (2006).
159. See Zezula, supra note 109, at 368-73.
160. Id. at 369 (quoting Bredesen v. Rumsfeld, No. 3:05-0640, 2005 WL 2175175 (M.D.
Tenn. Sept. 7, 2005).
161. Id.
162. See Rendell v. Rumsfeld, No. Civ. A. 05-CV-3563, 2005 WL 2050295, at *1 & n.3
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 26,2005).
163. See 32 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2006) ("However, no change in the branch, organization, or
allotment of a unit located entirely within a State may be made without the approval of its
governor.").
164. Pennsylvania Governor Edward Rendell, Washington Governor Christine
Gregoire, Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen, State of Missouri, then-Massachusetts
Governor Mitt Romney, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, and Connecticut Governor Jodi
Rell all filed suit to prevent then-Secretary Rumsfeld from recommending the changes.
165. Compare Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295, at *17, and Bredesen v. Rumsfeld, No. 3:05-
0640, 2005 WL 2175175, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 7, 2005), with Missouri v. Rumsfeld, No.
4:05CV01387JCH, 2005 WL 2172392, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2005), Romney v. Rumsfeld,
No. Civ. A. 0511821GAO, 2005 WL 2177118, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 8, 2005), and Blagojevich
v. Rumsfeld, 385 F. Supp. 2d 768, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2005).
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legality of Secretary Rumsfeld's recommendation that the 111th Fighter
Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard be deactivated and that
the Reserve Base in Willow Grove, Pennsylvania be closed.'6 In
addition to deactivating the 111th, Secretary Rumsfeld recommended
that half of its aircraft be assigned to Air Guard units in Idaho,
Maryland, and Michigan and its remaining aircraft be retired.1 67
The plaintiffs argued that the Secretary's actions violated 32 U.S.C.
§ 104(c) by making the recommendations without seeking the approval
of the governor and further asserted that the proposal would interfere
with the state's ability to address homeland security missions."6 In
response, the Secretary did not deny that he never sought consent but
instead argued that the governor lacked standing, that the issue was not
yet ripe, and that judicial review was precluded. 169 The district court's
decision began with the statement that "[t]he Complaint springs from
the principals of federalism reflected in the dual nature of the National
Guard as comprising both units of state militias and a part of the federal
armed forces, when those units are called into federal service.' 70 Given
this opening, it is not surprising that the court ultimately held that the
Secretary had indeed violated the statute and voided the
recommendation related to the deactivation of the Fighter Wing.' 7' In
rejecting the federal government's arguments, the court stated that
"[g]iven Congress's concerns about federalism as reflected in the dual
nature of the National Guard, we find that ... [the statute] applies
generally to require gubernatorial consent to changes in the branch,
organization, or allotment of a National Guard unit located entirely
within a State."'
172
Needless to say, the federal government appealed.1 73 Between the
district court decision and the appeal, however, the Secretary's
recommendation to close the base was rejected.7 7 As a result, the Third
Circuit determined the appeal was moot. 175 Judge Sloviter dissented,
166. Rendell, 2005 WL 2050295, at *1.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *2. The plaintiffs also argued that Secretary Rumsfeld violated 10 U.S.C.
§ 18238. Id. The Court ultimately rejected this argument. Id. at *21.
169. Id. at *6.
170. Id. at *2.
171. Id. at *17, *20.
172. Id. at *17.
173. Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2007).
174. Id. at 240-41.
175. Id.
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however."7 In the opening paragraph he relayed the reason for his
dissent.
If the issue before us were a dispute between
individuals, or between companies, or between one or
more individual and one or more company, I would join
Judge Nygaard's fine opinion for the majority without
hesitation. But the issue underlying the dispute between
Governor Rendell and the Secretary of Defense is not
confined to ordinary litigation. The seeds of the
difference between the parties goes back to the very
beginning of our existence as a nation, and it must be
understood in that context. I do not think it can or
should be resolved by the expedient of declining to
consider the merits under the rubric of mootness.1 "
After reviewing the long and complex history of the National Guard and
the parties' arguments, the judge concluded by stating, "I have reached
no decision with respect to the conflicting arguments but it is a
significant issue, one between the rights of the states and the federal
government harkening back to the very foundation of our
government. '' "7  Despite the fact that the governor had relied on a
solely statutory argument, both the district court and Judge Sloviter
relied on the broader federalism concerns underlying the case. 79 Both
judges implicitly questioned the scope of the federal government's
authority to control the National Guard.
The issues argued in the BRAC cases are more than academic, and
they prompt a question left open by the Supreme Court's decision in
Perpich. While ultimately upholding the legitimacy of the Montgomery
Amendment, the Supreme Court did suggest that a governor could
legitimately withhold consent for the deployment of National Guard
units "if the order were so intrusive that it deprived the State of the
power to train its forces effectively for local service.""' It seemed this
interpretation of the statute was necessary to maintain its constitutional
176. Id. at 243 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 243-44.
178. Id. at 251.
179. Rendell v. Rumsfeld, No. Civ. A. 05-CV-3563, 2005 WL 2050295, at *17 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 26, 2005); Rendell, 484 F.3d at 251.
180. Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 352 n.24 (1990).
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integrity. ' The Supreme Court appeared to accept the proposition that
there were limits to Congress's ability to commandeer the National
Guard for national purposes. What those limits are, however, remains
an unanswered and critical question.
The federal government's actions have had a significant and
practical impact on the states and their citizens. National Guard units
are increasingly called to federal service to provide "boots on the
ground" in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 9/11, National Guard and
Reserve personnel in active overseas federal service number over
100,000 at any given time.'2 According to some reports, in September
2005 more than one-third of the 135,000 troops in Iraq were National
Guard members and among the casualties over half were either
National Guard or military reserve forces. 83 The number of Guard
members sent abroad and the duration of their duty represent an
historic shift in federal reliance on these units."m Guard members can be
deployed for up to fifteen months and can be redeployed less than a
year later.1 5  These deployments can have a devastating impact on
families, employers, and communities. t 6
Perhaps more importantly, if the National Guard is serving abroad,
its members are unavailable to address domestic emergencies at
home."8  Governors have complained that the Guard's increased
workload has left states with inadequate resources to address natural
disasters and terrorism concerns as well as made retention of Guard
members more difficult." The governors' complaints are not without
181. Id. at 352.
182. See Ann Scott Tyson, Possible Iraq Deployments Would Stretch Reserve Force,
WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2006, at Al.
183. See Giuliano, supra note 46, at 348.
184. See id. at 348-49, 348 n.34.
185. Editorial, Balance Home, Away Time, MIL. TIMES, July 9, 2007,
http://www.militarytimes.com/community/opinion/army-opinion editorial_070709/; Rick
Maze, Senate GOP Leaders Block Webb Dwell-Time Plan, ARMY TIMES, July 11, 2007,
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/07/military-webb-dwelltime_070711w/.
186. See Kevin Johnson, Impact of Police Being Sent to Iraq Felt on Street, USA Today,
Dec. 8, 2006, at 18A, available at http://www.usatoday.comlnews/nation/2006-12-07-reserve-
officers_x.htm; Barbara Slavin, Reserve Troops Facing Job Woes, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 2006,
at 1A.
187. See Giuliano, supra note 46, at 352; Michael T. Cunningham, The Military's
Involvement in Law Enforcement: The Threat Is Not What You Think, 26 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 699, 712 (2003).
188. See Nathaniel R. Helms, Falling Morale Hurts Guard Retention, MILITARY.COM,
Nov. 24, 2004, http://www.military.comNewContent/0,13190,Defensewatch-112404_Helms,
00.html; Dan Balz, Guard Deployments Weigh on Governors; Length, Frequency of Tours
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foundation. When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, over forty
percent of Louisiana's and Mississippi's National Guard were on active
duty in Iraq.'9" But even if Guard members are available, the equipment
necessary to respond to catastrophic conditions is not.'" Following a
tornado that devastated a Kansas community, Kansas Governor
Kathleen Sebelius commented:
"[S]tates all over the country are not only missing
personnel, National Guard troops are-about 40 percent
of the troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan-
but we're missing the equipment. When the troops get
deployed, the equipment goes with them .... So, here in
Kansas, about 50 percent of our trucks are gone. We
need trucks. We're missing Humvees, we're missing all
kinds of equipment that can help us respond to this kind
of emergency."'91
Thus, the practical impact of the erosion of state control over the militia
cannot be overestimated.
Moreover, the National Guard's deployment abroad would seem to
contradict the recent National Strategy for Homeland Security. '92 The
National Security Council recognized the important role that the
National Guard must play as a domestic security force. 93 In discussing
goals for homeland defense, the Homeland Security Council
commented that the "National Guard forces are integrated into
communities throughout our country, and they bring to bear the largest
and most diverse workforce and capabilities in government to protect
the United States from direct attacks and conduct missions to deter,
Worry States, WASH. POST, July 19, 2005, at A3; Cunningham, supra note 187, at 712-13
("This operating tempo is difficult for these forces to maintain and is detrimental to units
through increased retention problems of personnel.").
189. See Bryan Bender, Demands of Wars Since 9/11 Strain National Guard's Efforts,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 2005, at A30.
190. See John Milburn, Kansas Gov.: Tornado Exposed Guard Holes, WASH. POST, May
8, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/0 8 /AR 20 07050
8 002 8l
.html.
191. Josh Catone, Kansas Tornado Disaster Highlights Lack of National Guard
Readiness Due to Iraq, THE RAW STORY, May 7, 2007, http://rawstory.comnews/2007/
Kansastornadodisaster- highlightslackof_0507.html.
192. See HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND
SECURITY (2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeland/nshs/2007/
index.html.
193. Id. at 50-51.
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prevent, and defeat threats against our Nation. ' 94 A Government
Accountability Office report supports the seeming contradiction
between the National Guard's role at home and abroad. 195  In a
statement to Congress, David Walker, the Comptroller General,
outlined the Army National Guard's struggle to meet the demands of
missions abroad while still maintaining a level of readiness necessary to
respond to domestic needs. 19 A year later, Janet St. Laurent, the
Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, expressed similar
concerns in her testimony before the Commission on National Guard
and Reserves.'"
The recent BRAC Act controversy provides the courts an
opportunity to closely examine the erosion of structural checks that has
resulted from a century of statutory changes. So far, the courts have
been cautious in their approach. But at some point, the issues will need
to be addressed. The National Guard is caught in a "tug of war"
between the states and federal government-with the states clearly
losing.198 If the National Guard is to perform its domestic security
function as provided for in the Constitution, its role as the backbone of
the federal forces will need to be reexamined as will the seemingly
plenary federal control of its utilization. 99
B. Congressional Delegation of Authority
The transfer of power over the National Guard from the states to the
federal government was accompanied by a similar transfer in power
over the military generally from Congress to the Executive Branch.
Through a series of statutory enactments, Congress has provided the
President with the power to deploy armed forces-both the federal
military as well as the federalized National Guard-in domestic
situations. When viewed in isolation, it is arguable whether any one
statute should cause alarm; when viewed in totality, however, they
194. Id.
195. DAVID M. WALKER, U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD'S
ROLE, ORGANIZATION, AND EQUIPMENT NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 2 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06170t.pdf.
196. Id. at 20-23.
197. JANET A. ST. LAURENT, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND
MANAGEMENT, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE READINESS FOR 21ST
CENTURY CHALLENGES (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d061109t.pdf.
198. See supra Part III; Mullins, supra note 46, at 346-47.
199. See WALKER, supra note 195, at 20-23; Mullins, supra note 46, at 339 ("[The
National Guard has] become the first line defensive and offensive components of the Total
Force.").
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provide a startling picture of the increased role of the military in
domestic life and the Executive's authority to control that role.
1. Insurrection Acts
The Insurrection Acts provide the primary source of authority for
the President to deploy the armed forces domestically to respond to
public disorder or to enforce civil law.2°° Immediately following the
Constitution's ratification, Congress used its powers under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 15 to authorize the Executive to employ the state
militias in domestic emergencies."' In 1792, under the Calling Forth
Clause, the Second Congress embarked on a three-year experiment,
delegating its authority to the Executive through the Calling Forth
Act. 202 In the Act, Congress created a "sliding scale" of discretionary
authority. °3 When the country was facing invasion, the President's
discretionary authority was at its apex; however, when it came to
enforcing the laws, the President's authority was at its lowest ebb,
requiring judicial authorization before it could be triggered, as well as a
proclamation order before sending in the militia.
200. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334 (2006). The Insurrection Acts are a series of statutes that
describe situations under which the Executive can order the deployment of the federal armed
forces or the National Guard to address domestic emergencies and enforce federal and state
law. Section 331 requires that the President receive an explicit request by the state before
deploying troops. Id. § 331. However, § 332 and § 333 describe situations in which the
President can act in the absence of a state request. Id. §§ 332-333. The focus of this section
will be on the latter two sections.
201. Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, repealed by Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36,
1 Stat. 424.
202. Id.; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114
YALE L.J. 149, 159 (2004).
203. Calling Forth Act of 1792, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. at 264 (differentiating between when the
President can call up the militia of his own accord and when he needs outside authority).
204. Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 264.
That whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent
danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe, it shall be
lawful for the President of the United States, to call forth such number of
the militia of the state or states most convenient to the place of danger or
scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to
issue his orders for that purpose ... ; and in case of an insurrection in any
state, against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President
of the United States, on application of the legislature of such state, or of
the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) to call forth such
number of the militia of any other state or states, as may be applied for, or
as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrection.
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Section 2 of the Calling Forth Act delegated authority to the
President to use the militias to execute the laws of the Union when
205
necessary. Unlike the largely discretionary power when an invasion
was involved, this Act provided significant limitations. First, the
President's authority was triggered only when an associate justice or a
district judge notified him that the execution of the laws was obstructed
by "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals."2
°6
Second, the President was required to call forth the militia of the
affected state first and call on other states' militias only when absolutely207
necessary. While the President was allowed to take such action when
Congress was not in session, his authority ended thirty days after the
next session of Congress began.2°
But the procedural and substantive checks placed in the original
Calling Forth Act almost immediately began to erode.20 Over the next
two-plus centuries, Congress provided the Executive with continually
expanding power to call on both the state militias and the federal armed
forces to execute the laws and control public unrest. Congress's actions
have corroded the horizontal check embedded in the Constitution,
resulting in a power imbalance in need of correction.
The first expansion of Executive discretion to use the military
domestically occurred within three years of the original statutory
205. Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 264.
[W]henever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the
execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful
to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the
powers vested in the marshals by this act, the same being notified to the
President of the United States, by an associate justice or the district judge,
it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the
militia of such state to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws
to be duly executed. And if the militia of a state, where such
combinations may happen, shall refuse, or be insufficient to suppress the
same, it shall be lawful for the President, if the legislature of the United
State be not in session, to call forth and employ such numbers of the
militia of any other state or states most convenient thereto, as may be
necessary, and the use of militia, so to be called forth, may be continued, if
necessary, until the expiration of thirty days after the commencement of
the ensuing session.
Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 67-68; Vladeck, supra note 202, at 162.
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delegation of authority.2 ° President Washington successfully used the
1792 Act to respond to the Whiskey Rebellion. 21   As required by
statute, President Washington delayed acting until he received
certification from an associate justice that the rebellion had exceeded
the control of civil authorities.1 2 Then, he issued a proclamation
ordering the insurgents to disperse and eventually mustered the militia
from the surrounding states to respond to the crisis.1 While not a
model of military precision, the rebellion was successfully quashed.
Although there is no evidence that the requirements in the original
statute interfered with the President's response, Congress amended the
statute to enhance the President's powers by deleting the requirement
that the President obtain a judicial certificate before using the militia
and also allowing the President to deploy the militia from other states
even when Congress was in session.2 4 Under the amended statute, it
would appear that the President did not need external affirmation that
the situation was beyond civilian authorities but could rely on his own
estimations. In addition, Congress removed the sunset provision in the
1792 Act and made it permanent legislation.215 In a passing nod to
limitations, the President was still required to issue a proclamation
ordering the rioters to disperse before using armed force to control the
unrest.
In the next decade, the federal government's reluctance to call on
the regular Army to enforce federal law ended.216 President Jefferson,
frustrated with his seeming lack of resources to combat the Burr
conspiracy, shepherded through Congress a bill that would allow the
Executive to employ the regular Army to suppress domestic
insurrection. 2 '7 The bill, signed into law by Jefferson in 1807, simply
210. See Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424, 424 (giving the President the power
to call out the militia domestically to enforce the laws of the United States).
211. See COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 67-68.
212. See id. at 36.
213. See id. at 38, 43.
214. Compare Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (requiring "an
associate justice or ... district judge" to notify the President that the militia is needed to deal
with an insurrection as well as allowing the President "to call forth and employ such numbers
of the militia of any other state or states" only when "the legislature of the United States be
not in session"), with Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. at 424 (requiring neither judicial
approval nor the recess of the Congress before the President can "call forth the militia").
215. See generally Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (containing no expiration date
for the Act).
216. See Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443; COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 83.
217. See COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 83.
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stated:
[I]n all cases of insurrection, or obstruction to the laws,
either of the United States, or of any individual state or
territory, where it is lawful for the President of the
United States to call forth the militia for the purpose of
suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the laws to
be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ, for
the same purposes, such part of the land or naval force of
the United States, as shall be judged necessary, having
first observed all the pre-requisites of the law in that
respect."'
The Act of 1807 evidenced a significant shift in the federal government's
view of the use of a standing army to enforce domestic law.219
Unfortunately, and surprisingly given the rather abrupt change in
position, there is no legislative history to guide a discussion on what
prompted the change. 20
The 1807 Act blurred the constitutional lines as well. When
Congress passed the Militia Acts of 1792 and 1795, it relied on Article I,
Section 8, Clause 15 for its authority. That provision clearly states that
Congress "shall have the Power . . . [t]o provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and
repel Invasions. '' 22' There is no similar provision, however, providing
authority to use the regular armed forces in the same manner.' It is not
entirely clear on which constitutional provision Congress relied to
authorize the use of the regular forces, although it can be assumed that
it relied upon the War Power Clause to do so.223
Congress's passage of the Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861
218. Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. at 443; see also DUMAS MALONE,
JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM, 1805-1809, at 253 (1974) (explaining President
Jefferson's motivation behind the passage of the aforementioned Act).
219. COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 347 ("The authorization to call militia and not regulars
was in keeping with the constitutional provision and with the feeling of the time that any use
of regulars in these domestic affairs smacked of the type of tyranny all good patriots thought
the British had practiced during the Revolution.").
220. Id. at 83 n.46 ("There is no record of any debate in Congress.").
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
222. See id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16.
223. See COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 347 ("The development of law on the two types of
action followed a roughly similar course, although the laws were based upon different
constitutional clauses.").
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further eroded the statutory checks on Executive authority to deploy the
military domestically.22 4 As is evident by the language, this amendment
greatly enhanced the discretionary authority of the President by altering
the trigger necessary to deploy troops.25  In the original Act, the
President was allowed to send troops only if the laws of the United
States were opposed "by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings., 226 Under the 1861 Act, the
President's authority was triggered if, in his "judgment," it became
"impracticable" to enforce the law "by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings., 227 In addition, the Act also omitted reference to civil law
enforcement officers contained in the previous Act and doubled the
time the President could require the militia to remain in federal service
after Congress had convened.
28
The language and circumstances under which the Executive was
allowed to send troops remained largely unchanged until recently. In
response to the chaos following Hurricane Katrina as well as concerns
regarding a potential public health emergency, Congress once again
amended the Insurrection Act.229 Under the recently amended version
224. Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, §§ 1, 3, 12 Stat. 281, 281-82
(amending Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 424, 424) (further removing
congressional oversight over the President's authority to raise and maintain a militia).
225. Id. § 1, 12 Stat. at 281.
That whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or
assemblages of persons, or rebellion against the authority of the
Government of the United States, it shall become impracticable, in the
judgment of the President... to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings, the laws of the United States within any State or Territory
... it shall be lawful for the President... to call forth the militia of any or
all the States of the Union, and to employ such parts of the land and naval
forces of the United States as he may deem necessary to enforce the
faithful execution of the laws . . . . or to suppress such rebellion in
whatever State or Territory thereof the laws ... may be forcibly opposed,
or the execution thereof forcibly obstructed.
Id.
226. Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264.
227. Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. at 281-82.
228. Compare Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. at 264 (allowing the
President use of the militia for up to thirty days after Congress reconvenes and referencing
powers of marshals), with Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, § 3, 12 Stat. at 282
(granting the President up to sixty days use of the militia after Congress reconvenes and
failing to reference marshals).
229. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (2006).
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of the Insurrection Act, the Executive "may employ the armed forces,
including the National Guard" to "restore public order and enforce the
laws of the United States, when, as a result of a natural disaster,
epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or
incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United
States the President determines" that the constituted authorities are
unable to do so.23° Under the previous statute, the President had only
the authority to respond to "any insurrection, domestic violence,
unlawful combination, or conspiracy., 231  Now the President has the
authority to send in federal troops to restore order following a natural
disaster, to enforce a medical quarantine if an epidemic ensues or, in
rather broad language, in any "other condition" the President believes
232
warrants military intervention.
The amendment is not without some limitations on Executive action.
It did keep in place the requirement that the President issue a
proclamation order before ordering military intervention. While the
proclamation order is intended to act as a procedural check against
unwarranted involvement, its worth is suspect. For example, President
Cleveland failed to issue the order until five days after the Army was
sent to Chicago during the Pullman strike and the delay had no effect on
the Supreme Court's review of the action." The amendment also
inserted an additional requirement-it mandated that the President
notify Congress of his decision to exercise his authority under the
statute and do so every fourteen days "during the duration of the
exercise of authority. 2 35 It is unclear what the notification procedure is
intended to accomplish. Other than the actual notification, it commands
nothing. This requirement-if one can call it that-is a far cry from the
original Calling Forth Act, which circumscribed Executive action when
Congress was in session and placed a thirty-day time limit on the use of
the militia.236
230. Id. § 1076(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2404-05 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 333).
231. 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
232. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
§ 1076(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2404-05 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 333).
233. 10 U.S.C. § 334 (2006).
234. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895) (upholding the President's assertion of
authority but failing to acknowledge that Cleveland relied on the Calling Forth Act); David
Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
155, 184 (2002) (recognizing that President Cleveland relied on the Calling Forth Act but did
not issue the required proclamation until five days after deployment).
235. John Warner Authorization Act, § 1076(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2405.
236. See Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (allowing the President
[91:1.0271062
TOWARD MILITARY RULE?
Congress is unable to agree on what changes, if any, the recent
amendment made to the President's authority. Some in Congress do not
believe that the amendment increased the Executive's authority but
rather clarified his existing power.237 Other members of Congress
perceive the amendment to both increase the power of the President to
involve the military in domestic law enforcement missions and to
undermine state control of the National Guard.238 The state governors
agreed with the latter position, unanimously opposing the amendment
contending that it constituted a radical shift in authority from governors
as Commanders in Chief of the National Guard to the federalgovernment. 39
Those contending that the amendment served to expand Executive
power have the stronger argument. One need only examine the
language of the two statutes to see that the breadth of situations under
which the Executive now has undisputed authority to send the military
into a state has grown." ° For example, the amendment appears to
provide the President the authority to enforce a public quarantine with
military force. Tellingly, before the amendment, President Bush
acknowledged he lacked that authority. In advocating for the ability to
send the military in situations involving the avian flu, President Bush
implored Congress to consider the issue and provide the Executive with
the statutory authority to address public health emergencies.' If, in
fact, the previous statute contained this authority, it would have been
unnecessary for the Executive to seek congressional authorization. As
Senator Kit Bond recognized in his statement before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, these changes "create[] triggers that make it
virtually automatic that the Act will be invoked during such
emergencies. 2
42
use of the militia for up to thirty days after Congress reconvenes).
237. See Bill of Rights Defense Committee, Remarks of Senator Edward Kennedy,
available at http://www.bordc.org/threats/hr5122.php (last visited May 13, 2008) ("While the
amendment does not grant the President any new powers, it fills an important gap in
clarifying the President's authority to respond to these new kinds of emergencies.")
238. See Hearing, supra note 7, at 38 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
("As with so much else this Administration has done, this is a raw expansion of Presidential
power. It is certainly not an expansion of power that should be granted without thoughtful
deliberation, and without extensive consideration of the far-reaching consequences.").
239. National Governors Association Letter, supra note 3.
240. 10 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1)(A) (2006).
241. Bush Military Bird Flu Role Slammed, CNN.CoM, Oct. 6, 2005,
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/05/bush.reax/.
242. Hearing, supra note 7, at 26 (statement of Sen. Kit Bond).
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Perhaps more important than the listed situations in which the
President can use armed force is the rather sweeping catch-all phrase
which allows the Executive to identify "any other condition" that may
warrant military intervention. The phrase is absent from any previous
statute and arguably presents an unprecedented increase in authority.
While reasonable people may differ about the importance and necessity
of such authority, it is difficult to argue that the amendment did not alter
the status quo.
The statute's ambiguous language is compounded by the Supreme
Court's hands-off approach to reviewing the President's decision to
employ the military domestically. In Martin v. Mott, the Court stated
that "the authority to decide whether [an] exigency has arisen, belongs
exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all
other persons." '243 The Court made the statement in a case involving
President Madison's decision to "call forth" the militia under the 1795
Militia Act.2 " Disagreeing with the President's assessment of
emergency conditions, Jacob Mott failed to report for duty and
consequently was subject to court martial for delinquency. ' He was
found guilty and appealed the decision on a number of grounds,
including that President Madison lacked the authority to call forth the
militia because no state of emergency existed.2 4 In an opinion written
by Justice Story, a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that it is for the
President-and the President alone-to decide the necessity of military
action.247
While the Court was certainly sending a clear message that members
of the militia were not free to decide for themselves the necessity of
their presence, the Court appeared to reject court review as well.2
Although the appellant raised the specter of a potential abuse of such
broad power in the hands of the Executive, the Court was not persuaded
that judicial intervention was appropriate.
It is no answer that such a power may be abused, for
there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse. The
remedy for this, as well as for all other official
misconduct, if it should occur, is to be found in the
243. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827).
244. Id. at 32.
245. Id. at 28.
246. Id. at 32-33.
247. Id. at 30.
248. Id. at 33.
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constitution itself. In a free government, the danger
must be remote, since in addition to the high qualities
which the Executive must be presumed to possess, of
public virtue, and honest devotion to the public interests,
the frequency of elections, and the watchfulness of the
representatives of the nation, carry with them all the
checks which can be useful to guard against usurpation
or wanton tyranny.
249
Based on this reasoning, the lower courts have cited Mott for the
proposition "that the decision whether to use troops or the militia
(National Guard) in quelling a civil disorder is exclusively within the
province of the President" and "is not subject to judicial review."25
Because the President's decision to employ the military is a political
one, it is not susceptible to judicial scrutiny.25' If there is a statute
authorizing the Executive's action, the Judiciary is restrained from
judging the propriety of such action, and as a result, there is no real
judicial oversight of the Executive's decision. The absence of judicial
review in the face of statutory authorization serves to magnify the effect
of Congress's delegation of its authority under the Constitution.
2. Other Statutory Authorization
The Insurrection Acts, however, do not provide the sole authority
for the President to use the armed forces in the domestic sphere.
Congress has authorized the President, or in some cases an agency
housed within the Executive Branch, to deploy the federal armed forces
or the National Guard in a number of other situations.252 The statutes
are troubling in at least two respects. First, they reveal the extent of
military involvement in domestic affairs, a role that is ever increasing in
a post-9/11 world. In many ways, the incremental introduction of the
military into the domestic life of the nation's citizens is more insidious
than the President's decision to send forces in response to unrest.
Second, Congress has left the exact role of the military ill-defined.
249. Id. at 32.
250. Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (D.D.C.
1973); see also Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Beale, 282 F. 934, 935 (S.D. Ohio 1922).
251. Mott, 25 U.S. at 31-32.
252. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C, §§ 374, 382 (2006); 16 U.S.C. §§ 23, 78, 593, 1861 (a) (2006); 18
U.S.C. §§ 112, 351, 831, 1751, 3056 (2006); 22 U.S.C. §§ 408, 461, 462 (2006); 25 U.S.C. § 180
(2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 98, 1989, 5170b (2006); 43 U.S.C. § 1065 (2006); 48 U.S.C. §§ 1418, 1422,
1591 (2006); 50 U.S.C. § 220 (2006).
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While it is generally understood that the majority of these statutes
provide the military with only a so-called passive role,253 neither
Congress nor the courts have yet determined the exact meaning of the
phrase. Such ambiguity serves to further blur the line between domestic
law enforcement and military conduct, thus undermining one of the
fundamental tenets of our society-civilian supremacy over military
power. Moreover, unlike interventions involving the Insurrection Act,
the military's involvement in these activities is protracted, involving
long-term missions without defined time parameters.
The military's growing role in domestic life began largely in response
to the "War on Drugs." In the 1980s, Congress authorized the military's
involvement in drug interdiction efforts, 2" eventually naming the
Department of Defense as the "single lead agency" in the effort to
curtail the importation of illegal drugs into the United States.255 The
military is authorized to provide civilian authorities with facilities,
equipment, training, expert advice, 56 and in certain situations, personnel
to aid in domestic law enforcement."' Under these provisions, the
military can intercept vessels and aircraft,258  provide aerial
reconnaissance, and use its advanced communications system to aid law
enforcement efforts.259
Congress has not limited the military's involvement to drug
interdiction efforts, however. The military is also engaged in enforcing
immigration and custom laws.26° National Guard members have been
253. Courts addressing the propriety of military involvement in a standoff between the
American Indian Movement and federal authorities first developed the "active" versus
"passive" dichotomy. The courts formulated the tests to determine whether the military's
involvement violated the Posse Comitatus Act. See United States v. Red Feather, 392 F.
Supp. 916, 921-23 (D.S.D. 1975); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (D. Neb.
1974); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 891,895 (D.D.C. 1988). Congress has adopted this
dichotomy in recent legislation. See 10 U.S.C. § 382(d).
254. See Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 374, 95
Stat. 1099, 1115 (1981); see also Dunlap, supra note 21, at 358.
255. 10 U.S.C. § 124(a). Congress has also authorized funding to support state National
Guard drug interdiction efforts. Pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 112, the Secretary of Defense is
authorized to provide monies to a governor to use that state's National Guard for counter-
drug activities. The National Guard would be acting in its capacity as a state entity.
256. 10 U.S.C. § 373.
257. Id. § 374; see also id. § 371 (allowing the military to provide civilian authorities with
information collected during training exercises).
258. Id. § 124(b).
259. Id. § 374(b)(2).
260. On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced that up to 6,000 National Guard
troops would be sent to the southern border to support the Border Patrol. Peter Baker, Bush
Set to Send Guard to Border, WASH. POST, May 15, 2006, at Al. The military does not
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sent to assist the Border Patrol by, among other things, operating
surveillance systems, analyzing intelligence, and installing fences.
2 6
Congress has authorized the Executive to call on the military to provide
domestic disaster relief, including work essential for the preservation of
life and property in the immediate aftermath of an incident.262 The
military may be employed in emergency situations involving weapons of
mass destruction 6 ' and even before 9/11, the armed forces could
provide assistance to state and federal law enforcement agencies to
respond to terrorism or threats of terrorism. 6
After 9/11, both Congress and the Executive sought to bolster and
consolidate power to better anticipate and respond to another attack,
including an increased involvement for the military domestically.
265
Through a variety of statutory measures, Congress expanded the role of
the military, blurring the line between domestic law enforcement and
military conduct.266 The USA Patriot Act,267 intended to coordinate the
efforts of federal agencies in protecting the United States from further
attacks,266 provided an increased role for the Department of Defense in
aiding the FBI in counter-terrorism efforts.2 69 The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (HSA) further encouraged the blending of the military into
the domestic sphere by creating an enlarged role for the Department of
appear to have direct legislative authorization for such actions but instead relies on 10 U.S.C.
§ 374.
261. STEPHEN R. VINA, CONG. RES. SERV., BORDER SECURITY AND MILITARY
SUPPORT: LEGAL AUTHORIZATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS (2006).
262. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2006).
263. 10 U.S.C. § 382; see also HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 192, at 6
(identifying terrorist attempts to obtain and use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a
primary concern).
264. 10 U.S.C. § 374.
265. Letter from John Warner, Chairman, United States Senate Committee on Armed
Services, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Oct. 11, 2001). Senator Joseph Biden
even advocated providing soldiers the power to arrest and detain civilians. Joyce Howard
Price, Biden Backs Letting Soldiers Arrest Civilians, WASH. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al.
266. See Christopher J. Schmidt & David A. Klinger, Altering the Posse Comitatus Act:
Letting the Military Address Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Soil, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 667, 673
(2006) ("[T]here is no bright line between criminal acts and acts of war."); Baker, supra note
260. Some commentators have observed that law enforcement has become increasingly
militarized as well. See generally Tom A. Gizzo & Tama S. Monoson, A Call to Arms: The
Posse Comitatus Act and the Use of the Military in the Struggle Against International
Terrorism, 15 PACE INT'L L. REV. 149, 162-63 (2003); David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman,
Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The Waco Disaster and the Militarization of American Law
Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REV. 619 (1997).
267. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
268. HOWARD BALL, U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY 16(2005).
269. 10 U.S.C § 374; BALL, supra note 268, at 16-17.
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Defense in traditionally civilian activities. 27' Before the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the military had always been
responsible for national security but with an outward-looking
approach.27' DHS was designed to coordinate homeland defense
including the military's involvement in domestic security issues. 272 The
presence of USNORTHCOM, 273 with its dual mission of homeland
defense and civil support, makes the federal armed forces readily
available for deployment domestically.
274
While Congress has been careful to maintain, at least rhetorically,
the primary role for civilian authorities in response to domestic
emergencies,275 the Department of Defense regulations provide several
exceptions to this rule. In addition to circumstances involving the
Insurrection Acts, the regulations identify so-called "constitutional
exceptions," which, in the view of the Department, allow the military to
take a lead role and, in some instances, act without Executive direction.
These exceptions are based on the "inherent legal right of the U.S.
government-a sovereign national entity under the Federal
Constitution-to insure the preservation of public order and the
carrying out of governmental operations within its territorial limits, by
force if necessary., 276  Although the regulations indicate that
presidential authorization is required for military intervention
domestically, they do recognize instances when the military can act in its
absence, most notably in "[c]ases of sudden and unexpected
emergencies . . . which require that immediate military action be
270. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in
scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.); BALL, supra note 268, at 25.
271. BALL, supra note 268, at 25; U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 13, at iii ("The military
has traditionally secured the United States by projecting power overseas.").
272. BALL, supra note 268, at 25.
273. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the formation of the United
States Northern Command on April 17, 2002. See Jim Garamone, U.S. Northern Command
to Debut in October, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., Apr. 17, 2002,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44159. Its self-described mission is "to
provide command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts
and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM defends America's
homeland-protecting our people, national power, and freedom of action." U.S. Northern
Command, About USNORTHCOM, http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html (last visited
May 13, 2008).
274. On its website, USNORTHCOM describes one of its visions as "[w]e will respond
not a minute too soon, or a second too late." U.S. Northern Command, NORAD and
USNORTHCOM Vision 2020, http://www.northcom.mil/About/history_..education/vision
.html (last visited May 13, 2008).
275. See 6 U.S.C. § 466 (2006); 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2006).
276. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(1) (2007).
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taken."2 7 In addition, military commanders are authorized to institute
martial law "if the circumstances demand immediate action, and time
and available communication facilities do not permit obtaining prior
approval. 278 While not explicitly stated, the regulations appear to leave
those decisions to the military officer present at the scene.
Moreover, the Department of Defense has identified as its "highest
priority" the protection of the "United States from direct attack." '79
Before 9/11 the military had consistently resisted Congress's attempts to
utilize its resources in the domestic sphere, fearing that it would
undermine its missions abroad. ° But according to the Department of
Defense,
[a] new kind of enemy requires a new concept for
defending the US homeland. The terrorist enemy now
considers the US homeland a preeminent part of the
global theater of combat, and so must we. We cannot
depend on passive or reactive defenses but must seize the
initiative from adversaries. . . . Defending the US
homeland-our people, property, and freedom-is our
most fundamental duty. Failure is not an option8
It is axiomatic that the military's new mission requires an increased
presence domestically and an aggressive stance towards identified
security issues.
To further confuse the issue, there are no clear guidelines defining
when the armed forces are acting solely in a civil support role and when
they are acting as part of a military mission. m  In the former
circumstances, the military is under the control and direction of civilian
authorities, thus maintaining at least a semblance of civilian control over
the military. In contrast, if the armed forces are on a military mission,
277. Id. § 215.5(a)(1); see also id. § 501.2. The so-called "immediate response" authority
was used to aid local authorities immediately following the bombing at the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the
United States, 49 A.F. L. REV. 67, 83 (2000).
278. 32 C.F.R. § 501.4 (2007).
279. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 13, at iii.
280. See id.
281. Id. at 40.
282. See Linda J. Demaine & Brian Rosen, Process Dangers of Military Involvement in
Civil Law Enforcement: Rectifying the Posse Comitatus Act, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
167, 182-84 (2005) (describing the lack of "authoritative statements" on how to classify a
military mission from civil response).
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then military commanders are in control, and success of the mission
takes precedence over the maintenance of civil liberties." Moreover, it
would appear that the military is not subject to the same statutory or
constitutional limitations when it is conducting a military mission as it is
when it is engaged in civil support.
It may be a distinction without a difference, however. The military's
involvement in the domestic sphere, even if sanctioned by civilian
leadership, arguably serves to undermine civilian control of the military
and leads to increased reliance on military force.2  It is difficult to
assess the effect of an increased military presence in civilian affairs. But
it has been recognized that the use of the military in civilian activities,
even on a small scale, has a detrimental effect on the exercise of
fundamental rights 85
While the military's presence in civilian affairs is not something that
can be entirely avoided, it is something that should be carefully
circumscribed and, when instituted, monitored. The current statutory
enactments combined with the culture of fear that has permeated policy
decisions since 9/11 leaves little room for limiting or questioning the
military's role in the domestic sphere. The military is increasingly
viewed as a panacea and, as a result, is becoming an integral part of
civilian affairs. Congress has created the very trap the founding
generation sought to avoid.
IV. RETURNING TO A SHARED POWER PARADIGM
In the last two centuries, the United States' position in the global
community and its national security needs have changed tremendously.
To meet these new needs Congress altered the composition and use of
the federal armed forces. During this process, Congress shifted a
tremendous amount of discretionary authority to the Executive to use
the federal armed forces, including the federalized National Guard, in
the domestic sphere. By so doing, Congress has undermined the shared
power paradigm created to avoid the pitfalls associated with an
Executive with the discretion to use military force to suppress internal
dissent.
Congress must address this shift in power. There is no question that
Congress has the authority to restrain Executive discretion in this area.
283. See John P. Coffey, Note, The Navy's Role in Interdicting Narcotics Traffic: War on
Drugs or Ambush on the Constitution?, 75 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1959 (1987).
284. See Dunlap, supra note 21, at 342; Kohn, supra note 16, at 186-87.
285. See Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985).
[91:10271070
2008] TOWARD MILITARY RULE? 1071
In the Constitution, Congress, not the Executive, is provided the
authority to define the circumstances under which armed force can be
used domestically. 86 And while it is generally recognized that the
Executive has the authority to deploy the military to respond to sudden
attack or to repel an invasion, 287 it is also acknowledged that that power
is not without limits. 2' Absent extraordinary circumstances 2 9 the
President must adhere to congressional limits in this area.290 Any
present day argument to the contrary ignores the history of the
286. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
287. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862) ("If a war be made by
invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by
force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for
any special legislative authority."); David Gray Adler, The Constitution and Presidential
Warmaking: The Enduring Debate, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 4 (1988).
288. Demaine & Rosen, supra note 282, at 218 ("Congress has supremacy over the
President for the domestic use of the military to execute the civil law."); Jules Lobel,
Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1427-28 (1989).
289. Arthur Schlesinger defined the scope of inherent presidential power in emergency
situations:
The criteria are clear: the threat must be unquestionably dire; time must
unquestionably be of the essence; Congress must be unable or unwilling to
prescribe a national course; the problem must be one that can be met in
no other way; and the President must do everything he can to explain
himself to Congress and the people.
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 323 (1973). But even in such
circumstances, some scholars suggest that the President must seek "retroactive ratification"
for his actions. See Adler, supra note 234, at 180 ("The Founders provided a solution to the
problem of emergency. If the president perceives an acute emergency for which there is no
legislative provision, he might, by virtue of his high station act illegally and then turn to
Congress for ratification of his measures."); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 38 (1993); Lobel, supra note 288, at 1427-28 ("The only
emergency power clearly provided under the Constitution is that of defending against armed
attacks by other nations. In other situations, the executive should be forced to seek specific
congressional authorization prior to acting, or to act unconstitutionally in those rare
emergencies which threaten the nation's existence and for which response is needed before
Congress can meet."). The Supreme Court has supported the use of retroactive ratification to
address constitutionally questionable actions by the President in emergency situations. See
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 671; The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 366-67
(1824).
290. See Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power, the Commander in Chief and the Militia
Clause, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 320-22 (2005) (discussing how the Militia Clause defused
any argument related to an inherent executive power); cf Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
2749, 2774 n.23 (2006) ("Whether or not the President has independent power, absent
congressioral authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his
powers."); Skibell, supra note 46, at 183 (recognizing that President Bush is presenting a
"unique" argument by suggesting that his authority cannot be infringed upon by Congress).
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Constitution's development,291 the text of the document,2 92 Congress's
early use of the Militia Clauses,292  the Executive's adherence to
longstanding statutory limitations,2 4 and Supreme Court precedents.2 95
Thus, Congress has both the authority and the responsibility to limit
presidential conduct in this area.
While it is unnecessary, and probably impossible, to mimic the
founding generation's original model, Congress can insert new checks
that disperse power as intended. First, it can address the erosion of the
vertical checks inserted in the Constitution by restoring the National
Guard to its original domestic security function. Second, it can limit the
Executive's discretion by creating more transparency in the decision-
making process, inserting additional procedural mechanisms, and
providing for more oversight. Third, Congress should act to bolster the
296resources, efficiency, and capabilities of civilian institutions.
Americans have become so enamored with the military and
disillusioned by its civilian counterparts that they are hardly aware, let
alone concerned, with the increasing role of the military in domestic
society. 297  The three approaches are necessarily intertwined. If
291. See supra Part II.
292. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; see also Monaghan, supra note 289, at 17.
293. See supra Part III.
294. President Washington closely adhered to the dictates of the Calling Forth Act of
1792 in his response to the Whiskey Rebellion. See George Washington, Proclamation (Aug.
7, 1794), in THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 457, 460-61 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1940); Letter from Secretary of State Edward Randolph to Governor Mifflin (Aug. 7, 1794),
in 4 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES 2D SERIES 112, 120 (1876) ("[T]he President... has
determined to take measures for calling forth the militia.... assembling a Body... from
Pennsylvania and the neighboring States of Virginia, Maryland and New Jersey."). Similarly,
when President Jefferson feared that the militia would be unable to control what he believed
to be a growing uprising under Aaron Burr, he sought congressional authorization to use the
regular army to suppress the perceived insurrection. Significantly, at no point did Jefferson,
one of the architects of the constitutional structure, rely on an inherent authority to deploy
the federal army to respond to Burr's conduct. Thus it was understood that the employment
of either the federalized militia or the federal army required congressional authorization. See
Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443; see also MALONE, supra note 218, at 253
(explaining President Jefferson's motivation behind the passage of the aforementioned Act);
COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 79, 80, 83.
295. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 588 (1952) (plurality opinion); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 688 (1862).
296. Kohn, supra note 16, at 182-83 (observing that the federal government is more
likely to turn to the regular armed forces for convenience and "because the civilian agencies
involved in homeland defense at various levels of government are not being funded
adequately").
297. See Neal Devins, Congress, Civil Liberties, and the War on Terrorism, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1139, 1146 (2003) (noting the importance of the American public as a
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Congress is to reduce the role of the federal armed forces in the
domestic sphere, it requires that the federal, state, and local civilian
agencies play a lead role with the National Guard acting as the primary
source of armed support when necessary.
Certain members of Congress have taken initial steps to address the
imbalance. Senators Patrick Leahy and Kit Bond have introduced
legislation to repeal the 2006 amendments to the Insurrection Act.2 98
Representative Tom Davis, along with thirty-five co-sponsors, has
introduced a companion bill in the House."9 Both bills are intended to
return the Insurrection Act to its pre-amendment status.3" While the
bills represent an important acknowledgement of Congress's authority,
they are not necessarily sufficient to correct over two centuries of
erosion.
Several commentators have also offered possible alterations to
current statutes that would narrow Executive power in this area."'
These commentators focus on reaffirming the importance of the
principles underlying the Posse Comitatus Act... and clarifying its
application, as well as consolidating the confusing labyrinth of statutes
that trigger the Executive's authority.3 3 Like the bills, the proposals
check on executive power).
298. See S. 513, 110th Cong. (2007).
299. See H.R. 869, 110th Cong. (2007).
300. See S. 513, § 1(b); H.R. 869, § 1(b).
301. See, e.g., Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle
in Need of Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 953, 980-81 (1997); Schmidt & Klinger, supra note 266,
at 682-86 (using Hammond's proposal as a starting place); Demaine & Rosen, supra note 282,
at 239-44; Jessica DeBianchi, Note, Military Law: Winds of Change-Examining the Present-
Day Propriety of the Posse Comitatus Act After Hurricane Katrina, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 473, 501-09 (2006). In contrast, at least one commentator has suggested an increased
role for the military in the wake of natural disasters. See Ashley J. Craw, Comment, A Call to
Arms: Civil Disorder Following Hurricane Katrina Warrants Attack on the Posse Comitatus
Act, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 829, 852 (2007).
302. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006). The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) currently provides that
"[w]hoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution
or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus
or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years or both." Id. It is perceived to be a limitation on the President's ability to use the
armed forces as a domestic police force. In practice, it fails to act as a substantive check
because of the myriad of exceptions to its application. But the PCA does represent an
important principle regarding the nation's distaste for the military as a domestic police force.
In this respect, the statute has important symbolic meaning.
303. See, e.g., Hammond, supra note 301, at 980 ("The third and best approach, is a
legislative reaffirmation of the fundamental principle behind the PCA with added guidelines
to help focus considerations of PCA exceptions."); Schmidt & Klinger, supra note 266, at
684-86 (amending Hammond's proposal and creating a statutory exception to the PCA);
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move the law in a helpful direction but fall short of adequately
dispersing power. The proposals fail to effectively limit Executive
discretion, and none of the recommendations directly addresses the
National Guard's role.3"
Congress must be bolder. As Justice Jackson observed, "[w]e may
say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of
Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping
through its fingers.""3 5  Congress can begin by amending the current
Insurrection Acts. Sections 331 through 333 of Title 10 of the United
States Code contain the primary situations under which the Executive
may deploy the military domestically, while § 334 requires the President
to issue a proclamation of dispersal before doing so. These four statutes
should be combined and new language inserted that restricts the
President's discretion, increases the states' role in the decision-making
process, and provides the National Guard-not the standing Army-
with the primary domestic security responsibilities.
The Calling Forth Act of 1792 provides a helpful blueprint for
amending the current statutes. First, it identifies the militia-now the
National Guard-as the sole domestic security force.3 6 In 1792, the
militia was a disorganized and undisciplined band of citizens, and states
were loath to respond to presidential requests to provide troops.'
Now, the National Guard is the fighting force that President
Washington imagined, 3°8 well-organized, well-disciplined, and perhaps
most importantly, available. It is capable of supplementing
overwhelmed civil authorities. As one commentator opined, "[T]he
hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the Guard, embedded in 3,100
communities, are the appropriate pool of military people" to address
domestic security issues. 3°9 The federal armed forces would remain
Demaine & Rosen, supra note 282, at 239-44 (recommending changes to the PCA and its
exceptions); DeBianchi, supra note 301, at 505-09 (amending the exceptions to the PCA).
304. See Hammond, supra note 301, at 980 (suggesting that the President would be
constrained by public opinion); Schmidt & Klinger, supra note 266, at 685-86 (placing a forty-
eight to ninety-six hour time limit on the use of armed forces); Demaine & Rosen, supra note
282, at 240-44 (involving the Attorney General or the Secretary of Defense in the decision to
provide military assistance); DeBianchi, supra note 301, at 508 (limiting the time of military
involvement to ten days unless the governor requests an extension).
305. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
306. See Calling Forth Act of 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264.
307. See COAKLEY, supra note 33, at 43.
308. See Mazzone, supra note 58, at 77.
309. Kohn, supra note 16, at 183.
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available but only if neither the civil authorities nor the National Guard
were able to restore order. This proposal is consistent with the framing
generation's intention that the militia would have a primary role in
domestic security." ° In addition, it will have the secondary effect of
forcing Congress to rethink the National Guard's role abroad. To fulfill
its domestic mission, the National Guard will need to have available
both personnel and equipment.
Second, under the original Act, the President was not the sole
decision maker. " He needed to be notified by a member of the Judicial
Branch that the laws could not be "suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings."3"' Moreover, the President did not have the
discretion to activate the militia from non-affected states if Congress
was in session."3 Thus, at least two branches were involved in the
decision to send troops. Such a check is totally absent under the current
law. Given today's communication capabilities, Congress should insert
a similar, albeit less stringent, requirement that another branch be
involved in the process. Under this proposal, the President could
respond to an immediate crisis in the absence of additional approval.
No later than forty-eight hours after issuing an order to send troops,
however, the President would need to obtain support for the necessity of
continued troop involvement from the Chair of the House Committee
on Homeland Defense or the congressional delegation from the affected
locale.
Third, the states' role in responding to domestic emergencies,
independent of the federal government's involvement, must be
recognized. The federal government is not the only entity capable of
activating the National Guard to aid in domestic emergencies. A state's
governor, as commander in chief of the state militia, has the authority to
utilize the National Guard in her own state or, upon request, to aid in
domestic emergencies in another state.314 In the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, Louisiana Governor Blanco requested and received the help of
National Guard units from neighboring states.315 To facilitate interstate
310. See id. (recognizing that the National Guard's traditional role was homeland
security and calling for its "re-orienting and re-ordering" in that direction).
311. See Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. at 264.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Eric Lipton, et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at Al (reporting that Governors from Alabama, Arkansas, and
Mississippi called up over 7,500 National Guard troops after Katrina).
315. There's a Lot of Time to Play the Blame Game, INTELLIGENCER J. (Lancaster, Pa.),
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aid, all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to become members of the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).316 EMAC,
established in 1996, provides states with a mechanism for obtaining
additional help during natural and man-made disasters as well as
terrorist attacks. 17  In such situations, the federal government's
intervention should be circumscribed.
The states' ability to request aid must be placed on an equal footing
with the federal government's ability to send troops in the absence of
such a request. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 331, a state may explicitly
request military aid from the federal government, but the circumstances
under which this can occur are quite limited.3 s Section 331 only
authorizes federal aid upon state request if "there is an insurrection[] in
any State against its government. 3 9 The requirement that a governor
declare that the state is experiencing an insurrection has, at times,
delayed the request for federal aid.32° In contrast, under the current
version of 10 U.S.C. § 333, the President can use the militia or armed
forces "to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence,
unlawful combination, or conspiracy" that interferes with the execution
of state or federal law or to "restore public order and enforce the laws of
the United States when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or
other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or
other condition in any State or possession" the state authorities are
unable to do so.2 It is odd that the President has the power to deploy
the military domestically in more situations than a state can seek aid. It
would seem, under most conditions, the state authorities would be in the
best position to determine the necessity of aid. The state should be
empowered to request aid under the same conditions that the President
can authorize use of the military.
Fourth, Congress should review the propriety of continued troop
involvement, thus avoiding their inappropriate use or the open-ended
Sept. 13, 2005, at A12.
316. Information regarding EMAC can be found at http://www.emacweb.org/. Congress
consented to EMAC in a Joint Resolution. H.R.J. Res. 193, 104th Cong. (1996); see also Pub.
L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996).
317. See Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat.
3877.
318. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
319. Id.
320. See Note, Riot Control and the Use of Federal Troops, 81 HARV. L. REV. 638, 641
(1968).
321. 10 U.S.C.S. § 333(a)(1)(A) (2007).
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commitment of the military to chronic situations. Under the current
statute, the President must notify Congress "every 14 days thereafter
during the duration of the exercise of that authority. ' ,121 Such a
provision is a step in the right direction but lacks teeth. The statute does
not require a report or even provide for congressional oversight. In
addition, Congress appears to be a bystander to the process. The statute
should require the President to provide a report describing the necessity
of continued troop involvement. Further, Congress should be an active
participant in the process, approving, disapproving, or amending
continued military involvement. As discussed previously, there is no
question that Congress has the constitutional authority to play an active
role in this area and additionally has a duty to provide oversight.
The following proposal provides a starting point for the discussion:
10 U.S.C. § 331
(a) The State may request, and upon request, the
President may call into service the National Guard of
other states to suppress any insurrection, domestic
violence, unlawful combinations, conspiracy or other
domestic emergency if it-
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of the State,
and of the United States within the State, that any part or
class of its people is deprived of the right, privilege,
immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and
secured by the law; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws or
impedes the court of justice under those laws.
(b) The President may, in the absence of such request
from the State, call into service the National Guard
(1) in circumstances described in (a)(1) if the
constituted authorities of the States are unable, fail, or
refuse to protect the right, privilege, or immunity, or to
give the protection described in (a)(2); or
(2) whenever the President determines that the laws
of the United States are opposed, or the execution
thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in civilian
322. Id. § 333(b).
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law enforcement officials.
(c) Whenever the President considers it necessary to use
the National Guard, he shall by proclamation
immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire
peacefully within a set period of time.
(d) The President may use the federal armed forces only
if the civil authorities and the National Guard are unable
to restore order within a reasonable time.
(e) The President shall notify Congress about the
decision to deploy the National Guard or the federal
armed forces as soon as practicable. No later than forty-
eight hours after issuing the order, the President shall
obtain support for the continuation of National Guard or
federal armed forces involvement from the Chair of the
House Committee on Homeland Defense or the
congressional delegation from the affected locale(s).
(f) Every fourteen days thereafter, the President shall
provide a report to Congress describing troop activity
and evidencing the necessity of continued troop
involvement.
Any statutory changes must be careful to balance the constitutional
concerns with the country's national security needs. The proposed
changes identified above maintain the federal government's ability to
respond to domestic emergencies while decreasing the role of the
federal armed forces in the domestic sphere. It allows the President to
act swiftly but not without oversight, and it returns the states and the
National Guard to a more prominent role in domestic security issues. It
also does not interfere with statutes that allow the federal armed forces
to provide humanitarian aid in domestic emergencies nor does it prevent
the military from aiding civilian law enforcement agencies indirectly.
The amendment begins to reverse the trend of the federal government's
reliance on and use of the federal armed forces in the domestic sphere.
It is, however, just a first step.
V. CONCLUSION
When viewed in totality, it is difficult to ignore the pooling of power
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in the Executive Branch. Providing the Executive with enormous
discretionary power to use the military in domestic emergencies
contravenes some of the basic principles that animated the founding of
this country. It also opens the door to potential abuse. The founding
generation recognized the potential for misuse, creating a shared power
paradigm to disperse power amongst the different government actors.
We must return to that paradigm, lest the possibility of abuse becomes a
reality.
In addition to curbing the potential for abuse, returning to the
original model will also bolster our homeland defense by making the
National Guard the primary domestic security force. Recent
government reports, emanating from both the Executive and Legislative
branches, have recognized the key role the National Guard plays in
deterring threats and responding to emergencies when they occur.
Under the current regime, the National Guard is ill-equipped to meet
these responsibilities. Restoring the National Guard to its intended role
will not only restore the constitutional balance but aid in the long-term
homeland defense goals identified by the federal government.
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